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Abstract 
A Survey of Hospital Employees’ Perceptions of Just Culture in a Northeastern 
Community Hospital. Marilyn R. Ireland, 2015: Applied Dissertation, Nova Southeastern 
University, Abraham S. Fischler School of Education. ERIC Descriptors: Hospitals, 
Health and Safety, Organizational Culture, Health Personnel 
 
This applied research study was designed to examine hospital employees’ perceptions of 
safety as it relates to error reporting. Data from safety culture surveys at the research site 
showed a clear trend of a perception of a punitive environment for error reporting. 
Hospital administrators depend on error-report data to create safe and reliable systems for 
care; therefore, a safe reporting environment is a critical component of a safe and just 
culture.    
 
A recently developed instrument was used to survey the 1,730 employees at the 
northeastern community hospital regarding their perception of just culture and safety in 
the error-reporting process. No significant relationships were established between survey 
scores (perceptions of just culture) and the variables of age, gender, experience, and 
degree of training in just culture principles for the overall study population. However, 
significant differences were identified when comparing groups consisting of specific 
positions or specialties. Notably, administration and management had a more optimistic 
viewpoint of just culture than other groups, particularly technologists and technicians, 
who had a somewhat diminished perception of just culture.  
 
The findings of this applied research study have implications for hospital leaders seeking 
strategies to improve the safety cultures within their organizations. Measurement of 
specific dimensions of just culture may be valuable in these settings; particularly, 
stratification of survey results by position with analysis of gaps between leaders and 
frontline staff may provide a clue to the maturity of the safety culture. The study is a 
valuable addition to the safety culture research community as it aligns with and extends 
findings from previous research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
The topic. The reluctance of hospital employees to report adverse events is a 
well-documented problem in the health care literature. Kohn, Corrigan, and Donaldson 
(2000) noted only about 5% of events are reported. Their seminal report published by the 
Institute of Medicine provided a glimpse into the scope of medical errors in the United 
States. Kohn et al. estimated up to 98,000 people die annually as a result of medical 
errors. Reasons for failure to report are generally attributed to fear of retribution, culture 
of blame, lack of knowledge of what and how to report, and lack of time and follow-up 
(Jeffe et al., 2004).  
Health care organizations have a long tradition of punitive responses to employee 
errors, particularly when a practitioner’s actions or treatment decisions are associated 
with poor patient outcomes. In congressional testimony, Dr. Lucian Leape, a foremost 
expert on patient safety, declared, “The reason we don't get voluntary reporting is that we 
punish people when they make errors” (VHA’s Risk Management Policy, 1997, p. 8). 
Unfortunately, this response results in a tendency for health care workers to cover up any 
except those errors that cannot be hidden (Marx, 2001). Failure to report errors has 
stymied efforts by health care administrators to identify the root causes of adverse events 
and design effective mitigation strategies. Government agencies, regulatory agencies, and 
health care think tanks have proposed various solutions for improving hospital safety 
cultures to encourage error reporting, such as mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, 
team training, and standardization of processes (Kohn et al., 2000).  
The research problem. The problem was that employees at a northeastern 
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community hospital system identified a perception that it was unsafe to report errors due 
to concerns incidents would be retained in personnel files and used in a retaliatory 
manner. The perception persisted in spite of programmatic efforts to improve the culture 
of safety.  
Since 2005, culture-changing efforts at the community hospital system have 
included programs such as (a) Leading the Way in Patient Safety, a proprietary 1-hour 
program for all hospital employees designed to introduce the concept of the high-
reliability organization and the employees’ role in promoting a culture of safety; (b) 
Speaking Up for Patient Safety, a proprietary 1-hour program for all employees of the 
community hospital system designed to introduce structured and positive assertion-
communication techniques; (c) Crucial Conversations, an in-depth, 14-hour, 
communication skill-building course, at first offered to hospital leaders and then to all 
employees; and (d) We Care Values Based Customer Service, a proprietary 1.5-hour 
program required for all employees and designed to reengage employee commitment to 
core values of the organization with an emphasis on safe and respectful communication. 
Numerous leadership development opportunities also have been offered. 
Background and justification. In 2002, in response to the Institute of Medicine 
report (Kohn et al., 2000), the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, now the Joint Commission, a nationally recognized health care 
accreditation organization, mandated accredited hospitals to implement the National 
Patient Safety Goal Program to address specific areas of concern relating to patient safety 
(Joint Commission, 2012). Six years later, the Joint Commission also required accredited 
organizations to select and implement a safety-culture measure to assess progress towards 
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this goal. Several safety-culture instruments have emerged in the literature (Colla, 
Bracken, Kinney, & Weeks, 2005; Singla, Kitch, Weissman, & Campbell, 2006). Most 
accredited health care organizations are using one of these instruments to measure 
progress toward developing safe cultures and reporting environments. 
Since 2008, the northeastern community hospital system of this study, accredited 
by the Joint Commission, has participated in an annual safety-culture survey offered by 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The AHRQ maintains a 
comparative database to which hospitals can voluntarily submit data to compare against 
other hospitals’ safety cultures. The Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(HSOPSC) consists of 10 dimensions pertaining to patient safety (AHRQ, 2004; Sorra & 
Nieva, 2004). The community hospital system is compared to other similar-sized 
hospitals with 100–199 beds. In 2013, 250 hospitals with 94,361 respondents were in the 
benchmark comparison group. Over the previous 6 years (since 2008), the community 
hospital system administered the survey annually to all employees in the hospital and 
associated primary care and specialty office practices. Employee participation in the 
anonymous survey gradually increased in the first 3 years, from 541 (28%) in 2008 to 
795 (39%) in 2010. In 2011 the survey was split; the original HSOPSC survey was 
administered to the hospital employees from 2011–2013 with a 37% response rate. A 
newly released AHRQ survey specific to the office practice setting was administered in 
the office practices with a 42% response rate.  
 One of the 10 dimensions of the HSOPSC contains three questions relating to 
nonpunitive response to error (AHRQ, 2004). On a year-to-year basis, this consistently 
has been the lowest scoring section on the survey for the community hospital system. 
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Trended data from the 2008–2011 surveys indicated 57% of employees believed there 
was a punitive bias within the hospital culture when errors occur, similar to other 
hospitals in the AHRQ comparative database. In 2012 and 2013, this number dropped to 
53%. The punitive bias was supported and validated by performance-management data 
from 2013 collected by the human resources department at the community hospital 
system under study. This perception creates a barrier to achieving a culture of safety and 
learning for employees, patients, and visitors by reducing the likelihood that mistakes 
will be voluntarily self-reported. 
 Hospital administration desired a program or intervention targeted at improving 
the culture of safety and promoting a safe reporting environment at the community 
hospital system. In 2010, based on industry best-practice reports, a decision was made by 
the hospital system’s executive leadership to launch a just culture program for leaders 
and employees throughout the organization. In 2011 all hospital leaders at all levels, 
approximately 160 individuals, received Just Culture for Healthcare Managers training 
(Outcome Engenuity, 2014). Approximately 45% of employees received Just Culture 
Safe Choices training in 2012–2013. Additional education to reinforce just culture 
principles was ongoing in 2014 for leaders and employees. The just culture programs 
provide foundational knowledge to help leaders and employees understand their 
respective roles and accountabilities for promoting a safe and just reporting culture.  
 Study setting. The health care system under study consists of a 178-bed, 
nonprofit, acute-care community hospital in the northeastern United States and 36 off-site 
primary-care and specialty office practices. In total there are approximately 2,100 
employees. The hospital specializes in emergency and trauma care, surgery, cancer care, 
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obstetrics, orthopedics, cardiovascular, rehabilitation, and numerous other inpatient and 
outpatient services. The researcher was employed in an administrative capacity for 
education services and had no supervisory authority over the study participants. The 
researcher’s role permitted access to employees and included an expectation that 
evaluation of programs and initiatives will occur. 
 Deficiencies in the evidence. An emerging strategy utilized by health care 
organizations to improve safety cultures is to develop a just culture approach to medical 
error management (Dekker, 2007; Marx, 2001; Reason, 1997). A just culture is one that 
seeks transparency and learning from errors and “one possessing a collective 
understanding of where the line should be drawn between blameless and blameworthy 
actions” (Reason, 2000, p. 769). Non-peer-reviewed health care magazine and journal 
articles have touted the just culture approach as a panacea to cure blame-prone work 
environments, and many health care organizations across the country have adopted this 
strategy. To date, however, little empirical research is available either to support or refute 
the efficacy of the just culture strategy. One of the initial arguments within the 
community hospital system against spending time and resources on implementation of 
the just culture program was the lack of empirical evidence to support the initiative. 
 Of the research that does exist, much has focused on defining and measuring 
safety culture and just culture within organizations. Another group of peer-reviewed 
articles described approaches or models for implementing just culture principles. No 
comprehensive program evaluation studies for just culture were identified in literature 
searches. 
Researchers have observed little qualitative research has occurred in the realm of 
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safety-culture assessment. In a review of 139 health care safety-culture studies Halligan 
and Zecevic (2011) noted only 10% of the studies utilized qualitative methods. In 
contrast, high-reliability organizations outside of health care have evolved the use of 
qualitative approaches to gain a deeper understanding of safety culture (Halligan & 
Zecevic, 2011). This represents a gap in the literature and an opportunity to develop 
future studies. 
 Audience. Numerous stakeholders could benefit from this study. Organization 
leaders might derive an indication as to the effectiveness of the just culture program and 
develop an increased sense of confidence and support for the process. Hospital leadership 
receptivity to just culture principles has been mixed, with some leaders at the community 
hospital system skeptical of the process due to lack of empirical evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of the program and a perception the nonpunitive, just culture process 
promotes lack of accountability for one’s actions. Other leaders fully embrace and 
conceptually understand and value the process. Employees of the community hospital 
system stand to benefit from enhanced leadership support and commitment to just culture 
principles when a fair and consistent process is used to assess medical errors. Petschonek 
(2011), the author of the survey instrument, the Just Culture Assessment Tool (JCAT), 
would benefit from application of the instrument and advancement of the research at 
another site. The provider of the Just Culture Safe Choices curriculum (Outcome 
Engenuity, 2014) and other organizations attempting similar efforts could benefit from 
the knowledge gained from the study. Patient-safety researchers can be aided by 
identification of further areas for study of these concepts. Ultimately, patients may 
benefit from fewer errors and better patient outcomes when care is provided in an 
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environment of heightened safety awareness and learning when an error does occur. 
Definition of Terms 
 For the purposes of this study, the following terms are defined.  
Adverse event. This term refers to “an injury resulting from a medical 
intervention” (Kohn et al., 2000, p. 210) or harm to a patient as a result of medical care 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS] Office of the Inspector General 
[OIG], 2010). Not all adverse events are preventable. 
Community hospital system. This term is inclusive of a hospital and associated 
medical office practices. 
Culture of safety or safety culture. These terms are used interchangeably. 
Halligan and Zecevic (2011) define safety culture as “the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment 
to, and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety programs” (p. 
339). 
Error. Kohn et al., (2000) defined error as “the failure of a planned action to be 
completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim” (p. 54). Medical 
errors do not necessarily result in adverse events. 
High-reliability organization. This term refers to “extremely safe, high risk 
organizations” (Halligan & Zecevic, 2011, p. 338). Examples are the aviation and nuclear 
power industries. 
Just culture. This term is defined as “an organizational context in which health 
professionals feel assured that they will receive fair treatment when they report safety 
incidents” (Weiner, Hobgood, & Lewis, 2008, p. 403). 
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Near miss. This term refers to a close call or warning event “that could have had 
adverse consequences but did not” (Barach & Small, 2000, p. 761).  
Preventable harm. This term is defined as “presence of an identifiable, 
modifiable cause of harm” (Nahban et al., 2012, p. 1). 
Patient safety. This term is defined as “freedom from accidental injury” due to 
medical care or medical errors (Kohn et al., 2000, p. 211). 
Psychological safety. This term is defined as a fair and nonpunitive work 
environment where employees do not fear punishment for “expressing their true selves at 
work” (Rathert & May, 2007a, p. 5). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to extend the empirical research related to 
measurement of the just culture dimensions of a safety culture and to investigate the 
impact of a just culture program implemented at a northeastern community hospital. The 
study would help to establish the current state of the just culture at the community 
hospital and provide a benchmark data point for use in ongoing culture-changing efforts. 
This was achieved specifically by utilizing the JCAT instrument to survey hospital 
clinicians to gain an understanding of the overall perceptions of fairness and justice in 
relation to adverse event reporting for this population (Petschonek et al., 2013). The 
results of this study provide hospital leadership with objective data regarding the use of 
the just culture process, which will inform future decisions regarding implementation of 
this and other safety-culture programming. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The purpose of this study was to survey health system employees at a 
northeastern community hospital to gain an understanding of the overall perceptions of 
fairness and justice in relation to adverse event reporting for this population. The 
literature review begins with an overview of the current state of adverse event reporting 
in health care and then focuses on the problem of event underreporting in health care 
organizations, examining current literature and relevant seminal works. A theoretical 
framework for psychological safety in organizations is introduced. Since few studies 
were identified specific to just culture, the safety culture literature in general is reviewed, 
followed by a focused review of the state of the literature pertaining to the topic of just 
culture.  
Adverse Event Reporting in Health Care 
Health care organizations are increasingly complex, highly technical, error-prone 
systems. Human-factors scientists recognize humans are fallible and apt to make errors 
(Reason, 1997). In the health care setting, errors that reach patients may cause no harm, 
to minor or severe harm, or even death. Improvements in patient safety depend upon 
accurate information regarding errors and adverse events in order to develop more 
reliable mitigation strategies and error-resistant systems (Classen et al., 2011). This 
information is also necessary to provide an ongoing measure to judge whether 
interventions have been effective in improving error and adverse event rates.  
Adverse event and preventable harm incidence and costs. An adverse event is 
defined as “an injury resulting from a medical intervention” (Kohn et al., 2000, p. 210). 
Not all adverse events are preventable. Preventable harm results from “presence of an 
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identifiable, modifiable cause of harm” (Nahban et al., 2012, p. 1). Adverse events have 
been estimated to occur in 7.5–33% of hospital admissions (Baker et al, 2004; Classen et 
al, 2011). Experts have suggested 37–60% of adverse events are preventable and in fact 
seem to be on the rise (Baines et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2004; James, 2013). There is 
debate and disagreement within the health care community as to whether all adverse 
events may be preventable (Classen et al., 2011; James, 2013). 
The indirect cost of adverse events is staggering in terms of lost lives, loss of 
employment, and disability. Since the landmark Institute of Medicine report (Kohn et al., 
2000), newer studies have suggested 180,000–210,000 deaths occur annually from 
adverse events in hospitals (James, 2013; U.S. DHHS OIG, 2010), more than double the 
original estimate. Direct costs to the health care system are exacerbated by prolonged 
duration of hospital stay and readmissions for treatment of complications (U.S. DHHS 
OIG, 2012). Kohn et al. (2000) estimated the direct costs of adverse events to the health 
care system to be $37.6 billion and of preventable adverse events to be $17 billion 
annually. A series of studies investigating quality of care in hospitals conducted by 
HealthGrades from 2004–2011 identified $2.3 billion to $3.1 billion in potentially 
avoidable annual costs for preventable adverse events in the Medicare population alone 
(HealthGrades, 2005, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). Notably, the 
HealthGrades studies utilized Medicare data from every hospital in the country and were 
able to draw comparisons between large and small hospitals, teaching and nonteaching 
hospitals, and various regions of the county. A study conducted by the U.S. DHHS OIG 
(2010) estimated $4.4 billion was spent in 2008 on adverse events experienced by 
Medicare beneficiaries. In an era of cost containment and focus on quality, reduction of 
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preventable adverse events represents a significant opportunity to trim health care costs. 
Reporting systems. Over the years various techniques have been used to detect 
adverse events in hospitals. Reporting is conducted both internal and external to health 
care organizations. The traditional internal-reporting approaches used in most health care 
organizations for decades have been to conduct retrospective medical-record reviews and 
to rely upon clinician self-reporting of errors through institutional incident-reporting 
systems and patient complaints (Classen et al., 2011; Cullen et al., 1995; O’Neil et al., 
1993). Reporting systems in hospitals are typically voluntary and may permit anonymous 
and confidential reporting. As a result, it is often difficult to confirm accuracy of event-
reporting rates, verify details of actual incidents, or provide feedback to those who report 
errors. It is generally recognized that voluntary error-reporting systems are unreliable and 
inefficient in detecting adverse events and may lead to unreliable conclusions about the 
state of patient safety within organizations (Classen et al., 2011). 
The record-review process is primarily manual and as a result is costly and time 
consuming. Data collection historically has been plagued with interrater reliability issues 
in the application of medical screening criteria. For instance, an early study by O’Neil et 
al. (1993) identified nearly the same number of adverse events from physician self-
reporting as with retrospective chart review but less than 50% of the same events. In 
recent years, specific screening indicators have been developed to help standardize and 
automate the record-review process, such as the AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators and the 
Utah/Missouri Patient Safety Indicators (Classen et al., 2011). These screening methods 
rely on detection of specific discharge codes in the medical record.  
Classen et al. (2011) demonstrated a two-step record-review process consisting of 
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initial manual screening of medical records by nurses or pharmacists trained to detect 
specific global triggers, followed by in-depth review by a physician, could uncover 90% 
more adverse events than the previously described methods. Although more rigorous and 
accurate, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s Global Trigger Tool still relies on 
manual screening and review by clinical experts (Classen et al., 2011). As electronic 
medical-record systems evolve, it is expected there will be less dependence on voluntary 
reporting systems and manual data extraction and more automated screening for 
documentation triggers alerting to adverse events. 
While most hospitals have internal reporting systems, many states have external 
reporting requirements. Karlsen, Hendrix, and O’Malley (2009) reported 27 states have 
mandatory adverse-event reporting requirements. The federal Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2005 provided for formation of patient-safety organizations within 
states to collect adverse event data (Farley et al., 2012). The 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act advocated for a nationwide system for reporting adverse events in 
order to gather and trend more data about health care errors (Farley et al., 2012). This is a 
politically charged issue, with debate centering on whether reporting should be 
mandatory or voluntary. Regulatory agencies such as the Joint Commission (2013) have 
encouraged accredited organizations to report specific, reviewable, sentinel events, or 
those events resulting in death or permanent loss of function. 
Underreporting of adverse events. The underreporting of adverse events has 
been acknowledged in the medical literature since the 1990s. Over the years researchers 
have addressed the issue of health care employees’ failure to report medical errors and 
found the problem is widespread. Cullen et al. (1995) found only 6% of adverse drug 
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events were reported through the hospital’s quality-assurance program. In the United 
Kingdom, a retrospective review of records (N = 500) in two London obstetrics hospitals 
found staff reported only 23% of the 198 identified adverse events (Stanhope, Crowley-
Murphy, Vincent, O’Connor, & Taylor-Adams, 1999). Stanhope et al. (1999) noted the 
more serious the error, the more likely it would be reported. Only 15% of minor incidents 
were reported. In a review of the literature, Barach and Small (2000) determined 
underreporting of adverse events ranges from 50–96% annually. Over a decade later, a 
study conducted by the U.S. DHHS OIG (2012) in 189 U.S. hospitals affirmed only 14% 
of errors experienced by Medicare beneficiaries were reported. Reasons for 
underreporting are mixed; the U.S. DHHS OIG (2012) study indicated administrators 
believed staff was unclear about what to report. Other studies supported this viewpoint 
but also identified a number of attitudinal and other barriers to reporting (Evans et al., 
2006; Hartnell, MacKinnon, Sketris, & Fleming, 2012).  
Underreporting of medical errors is not a problem unique or isolated to the United 
States. The phenomenon of underreporting and attendant implications for patient safety 
have been observed and studied in countries including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia (Cooke, Dunscombe, & Lee, 2007; Evans et al., 2006; 
Farley et al., 2012; Hartnell et al., 2012; Kaldjian et al., 2008; Stanhope et al., 1999; 
Wakefield, McLaws, Whitby, & Patton, 2010). Common themes emerged surrounding 
error reporting, regardless of country or year of study origin. These included similar 
barriers to error reporting, the likelihood that less serious errors would not be reported, 
the importance of leadership support for error reporting, and the observation that clinician 
self-reporting of errors is unreliable. 
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It is generally recognized current systems of reporting errors, whether mandatory 
or voluntary, do not reliably reflect actual incidence of errors, and there is little evidence 
that reporting has improved in the decade since Kohn et al.’s (2000) report (Kaldjian et 
al., 2008; U.S. DHHS OIG, 2012). Although it is widely believed improvements in error-
reporting will lead to improvements in patient safety, Jeffe et al. (2004) noted no studies 
have actually been conducted to test this hypothesis. 
Barriers to error reporting. Studies conducted in the past decade investigating 
barriers to error reporting have found little variation in underlying themes over time. 
Uribe, Schweikhart, Pathak, Merrell, and Marsh (2002) used a qualitative focus-group 
approach conducted in an academic medical center in the U.S. Midwest to explore 
barriers to error reporting. The researchers identified individual and organizational 
factors contributing to nurses’ (n = 66) and physicians’ (n = 56) failure to report medical 
errors. The top six factors for each group differed, with the only common barriers 
identified as time and work involved in error reporting. Physicians identified more 
barriers than nurses. The top barriers identified by physicians related mainly to 
knowledge deficits regarding what and how to report and failure to understand the 
significance of reporting and its contribution to quality of care. The top reasons cited by 
nurses for not reporting errors related more to individual and cultural concerns about 
negative impacts on colleagues and fear of lawsuits (Uribe et al., 2002).  
Jeffe et al. (2004) substantiated the findings of Uribe et al. (2002), noting barriers 
to error reporting include not knowing what or how to report, concerns about lack of 
confidentiality and follow-up, fear of repercussions, and lack of time and ease of using 
error-reporting systems. Nurses tended to be more concerned about being disciplined for 
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errors. Conversely, physicians were more concerned about malpractice litigation (Jeffe et 
al., 2004).  
In Canada, a qualitative study by Hartnell et al. (2012) focused specifically on 
identifying reasons for underreporting of medication errors in four Nova Scotia 
community hospitals. The researchers conducted focus groups with nine nurses, 
pharmacists, and physicians at each site and found barriers related to five themes: (a) 
reporter burden or work involved in reporting, (b) professional identity issues relating to 
fear of loss of reputation, (c) information gap relating to lack of knowledge about what or 
how to report, (d) organizational barriers relating to the perception that nothing will be 
done about the issue, and (e) fear of reprisal or litigation (Hartnell et al., 2012). 
Studies have suggested nurses are more likely than physicians to report errors 
(Evans et al., 2006; Jeffe et al., 2004; Rowin et al., 2008; Wild & Bradley, 2005). Jeffe et 
al. (2004) explored hospital physicians’ (n = 59) and nurses’ (n = 30) perspectives on 
error reporting using a focus-group approach. The study was conducted in 20 academic 
and community hospitals in St. Louis, Missouri. Jeffe et al. found nurses were more 
knowledgeable than physicians about how to use error-reporting systems. An Australian 
study conducted in six hospitals by Evans et al. (2006) surveyed 186 doctors and 587 
nurses. Similar to the study by Jeffe et al., Evans et al. found nurses to be more 
knowledgeable and more likely to file incident reports than doctors.  
Wild and Bradley (2005) conducted research to investigate error-reporting habits 
of nurses and residents in a community hospital in Connecticut. Their descriptive survey 
research targeted nurses working on inpatient units in hospitals (n = 36) and doctors 
receiving training in residency programs (n = 24). Similar to Jeffe et al. (2004), Wild and 
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Bradley found resident physicians were less knowledgeable about the error-reporting 
system than nurses. Only 29% of residents felt comfortable reporting errors to 
supervisors, compared to 64% of nurses. Overall, nurses were more likely than residents 
to report an error to supervisors. Wild and Bradley concluded error reporting may be 
biased toward identification of more nursing errors, since nurses filed the greater number 
of reports. The findings from these studies suggest education is needed to promote error 
reporting by physicians. 
The morbidity, mortality, and extensive costs of adverse events to patients and the 
health care system create a moral and economic imperative to take action. At the 
international level, there is interest in promoting patient safety by reducing adverse 
events associated with medical care. The recurrent theme of lack of safety in reporting is 
troublesome and is a focus of this study. The World Health Organization has established 
global priorities for patient safety and ranks research of methods to measure and improve 
cultures of safety as a high priority for developed countries (Research Priority Setting 
Working Group, 2008). 
 Psychological Safety: A Theoretical Framework  
 A sense of personal safety is a necessary prerequisite for error reporting. Creation 
of a culture of safety is dependent upon a foundation of trust stemming from a 
psychologically safe work environment. Health care researchers long have suspected that 
psychologically safe work environments will lead to fewer errors and better overall team 
performance (Edmondson, 1999). A proliferation of safety-culture research in the past 
decade has been accompanied by emerging foundational theories of psychological safety. 
 The current study was grounded in the theoretical framework of person-centered 
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work environments and psychological safety (Rathert, Ishqaidef, & May, 2009; Rathert & 
May, 2007b). This theory postulates that person-centered work environments influence 
caregivers’ affect and psychological safety. A person-centered work environment is “one 
that supports the care of patients and the well-being of care-providers” (Rathert & May, 
2007b, p. 110). Rathert and May (2007b) identified three dimensions comprising a 
person-centered work environment: a climate for patient-centered care, a climate for 
quality improvement, and benevolent ethical climates. 
In a climate for patient-centered care, care providers are afforded the knowledge-
based tools and resources to engage families and patients as active participants and 
decision makers in their care. In such a climate caregivers are engaged and derive high 
levels of job satisfaction, which may contribute to reduced risk for medical errors 
(Rathert et al., 2009). A climate that supports continuous quality improvement promotes 
teamwork and learning behaviors and empowers caregivers to test new ideas to improve 
care processes. A benevolent ethical climate is one that serves the greater good of the 
group, as opposed to individuals. Care providers perceive the values and ethics of the 
care environment enable a focus on the well-being of patients. This environment tends to 
be nonpunitive, thereby encouraging reporting of errors so the team can learn from the 
mistakes of others (Rathert & May, 2007b). 
Rathert and May (2007b) proposed interdependencies exist between the person-
centered work environment and care providers’ and patients’ outcomes. The person-
centered work environment contributes to patient-centered care, positive affect, and 
psychological safety of care providers. Thus the well-being of both care providers and 
patients is enhanced, which ultimately promotes improvements in patient safety.  
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The hypotheses to be tested in the current study posited that manipulation of the 
organizational climate and culture by introducing a just culture model would improve 
employee perceptions of fairness and justice and thus promote a safer environment for 
error reporting. This ultimately could result in improving care-provider well-being and 
quality and safety of patient care.  
Culture of Safety 
Safety culture versus safety climate. The study of safety cultures was 
popularized after the major industrial nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986 revealed 
managerial and human factors as well as systems issues contributed to the accident 
(Guldenmund, 2000). Hospital leaders have focused on improving safety cultures since 
the Institute of Medicine report (Kohn et al., 2000) revealed the extent of medical errors 
in health care organizations. McCarthy and Blumenthal (2006) noted a lack of 
standardized approaches complicated efforts to create a patient-safety culture within 
health care organizations. In spite of this, the literature relating to the study of safety 
culture in health care is extensive. Halligan and Zecevic (2011) conducted a systematic 
review of 139 peer-reviewed articles related to health care safety culture published from 
1980–2009. Similarly, Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains, and Lackan (2010) extracted data 
from 38 studies to design a conceptual model of a culture of safety. Even with such an 
abundance of literature available, health care leaders find it difficult to articulate what a 
culture of safety is and how to create it. Both studies determined safety cultures consist of 
multiple dimensions. Both Sammer et al. and Halligan and Zecevic noted interventions to 
improve safety culture could focus on single dimensions or be multidimensional.  
Promotion of safety culture is recognized as a primary patient-safety strategy 
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(Kohn et al., 2000; Singla et al., 2006; Weaver et al., 2013). Safety culture is a 
component of the larger organizational culture (Morello et al., 2013). The purpose of the 
study by Halligan and Zecevic (2011) was to clarify definitions, concepts, dimensions, 
and measures related to safety culture and climate and to determine if progress had been 
made toward the goal of improving safety culture in the health care industry. Halligan 
and Zecevic found the most frequently used definition of safety culture to be  
the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns 
of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organization’s health and safety programmes. Organizations with a positive safety 
culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared 
perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of 
preventive measure. (pp. 339–340) 
The terms safety culture and safety climate are often used interchangeably in the 
health care literature. Halligan and Zecevic (2011) provided a differentiated view of these 
terms by clarifying safety climate is most often described as “surface features of the 
safety culture from attitudes and perceptions of individuals at a given point in time” (p. 
340). Hence, the surveys most commonly employed in assessment of safety culture are 
actually measuring safety climate, providing only a glimpse or snapshot of an 
organization’s overall safety culture.  
Assessing safety culture. Safety cultures are commonly defined and measured by 
a variety of properties. In a qualitative meta-analysis of safety-culture studies, Sammer et 
al. (2010) were able to construct a conceptual model composed of seven subcultures of 
patient-safety properties: leadership, teamwork, evidence based, communication, 
learning, just, and patient centered. Similar themes were recognized by Halligan and 
Zecevic (2011), with the most frequent dimensions of safety culture identified as 
“leadership commitment to safety, open communication founded on trust, organizational 
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learning, non-punitive approach to error-reporting, teamwork, and shared belief in the 
importance of safety” (p. 340).  
Since 2004, numerous survey instruments have been developed to conduct safety 
culture or climate measures. The majority integrate some combination of the 
aforementioned dimensions of safety culture. Three systematic literature reviews were 
identified that outlined and compared the variety of instruments available (Colla et al., 
2005; Flin, Burns, Mearns, Yule, & Robertson, 2006; Singla et al., 2006).  
Colla et al. (2005) examined nine safety-climate surveys for general 
characteristics, dimensions, psychometric testing, and use in studies. Findings revealed 
seven of the nine surveys evaluated five common dimensions of patient safety: 
leadership, policies and procedures, staffing, communication, and reporting. Four 
surveys, including the HSOPSC used at the northeastern community hospital under study, 
underwent comprehensive and sound psychometric testing. Only one survey, the Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire by Sexton, Thomas, and Helmreich (as cited in Colla et al., 
2005), was used in a study to explore patient outcomes.   
Flin et al. (2006) conducted a similar analysis of 12 quantitative, safety-climate 
survey studies, including eight of the surveys examined by Colla et al. (2005). Flin et al. 
placed more emphasis on expanding the analysis of psychometric properties for each of 
the surveys, examining content validity, factor structure and internal reliability, and 
criterion validity. Just two of the surveys were found to be loosely linked to theoretical 
foundations. Most of the surveys were adapted from safety-climate surveys used in other 
industries, which should be considered a limitation given differences and less clarity in 
leadership structure (Flin et al., 2006). Similar to Colla et al., Flin et al. found many of 
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the surveys had undergone limited analysis of the psychometric properties, with the 
HSOPSC having undergone the most rigorous factor analysis of all the surveys reviewed.   
A systematic review conducted by Singla et al. (2006) examined 13 safety-culture 
instruments inclusive of 23 safety dimensions. Whereas Colla et al. (2005) and Flin et al. 
(2006) focused on general descriptors such as number of items, settings for use, and 
analysis of psychometric properties of identified surveys, Singla et al. conducted a more 
detailed assessment of the item content of the surveys. Singla et al. went so far as to 
categorize the 657 questions from the 13 surveys into 23 distinct patient-safety 
dimensions with definitions in an effort to define elements critical to patient-safety 
culture. Safety-climate surveys generally address as few as four or as many as 20 
dimensions (Colla et al., 2005; Singla et al., 2006). Singla et al. noted the factors were in 
six categories: management and supervision, risk, work pressure, competence, rules, and 
miscellaneous. The 23 safety-culture dimensions identified and defined by Singla et al. 
are management and institutional commitment to safety; communication openness; 
beliefs about causes of errors and adverse events; nonpunitive response to error; what 
should be reported and to whom; teamwork; feedback and communication; institutional 
responses; reporting infrastructure; work pressure; overall perception of safety; adequacy 
of training and supervision; organizational learning; handoffs, transitions, and 
coordination of care; patient safety planning; adequacy of equipment, information, and 
processes; adequacy of crisis management; compliance with rules and procedures; job 
satisfaction; adequacy of staffing; willingness to ask for help; detection infrastructure; 
and risk taking.  
Safety culture or climate surveys tend to have a generalist or specialist focus, 
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applicable to a broad target audience of care providers or focused in specialty units like 
an operating room or intensive care unit (Singla et al., 2006). Researchers have found 
much variation in psychometric testing rigor; many instruments provided no 
documentation of testing at all, and a few had undergone extensive testing inclusive of 
item analysis, exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, Cronbach’s alpha, and test–
retest reliability. The HSOPSC and the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire emerged as two of 
the more rigorously tested instruments (Colla et al., 2005; Jackson, Sarac, & Flin, 2010; 
Singla et al., 2006). 
The practice of using safety-climate surveys in health care is dynamically 
evolving. Recent research revealed six surveys gaining favor in the health care industry. 
The HSOPSC, Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare 
Organizations, and the Hospital Safety Climate Scale are popular in the United States and 
have been used in international studies (Jackson et al., 2010). Researchers in the United 
Kingdom also noted the Manchester Patient Safety Assessment Framework and the 
Safety Climate Survey are well known and rigorously tested (Health Foundation, 2011). 
Each survey is designed to measure various dimensions of safety culture and has inherent 
strengths and weaknesses, making survey selection an activity not to be taken lightly by 
an organization (Health Foundation, 2011). 
With so many safety culture and climate surveys available, it is interesting to note 
the aforementioned popular surveys have few survey items relating to error reporting and 
nonpunitive response to error, key measurement elements for just culture. Nine of the 
surveys reviewed by Singla et al. (2006) addressed nonpunitive response to error and 
error reporting with 1–11 items in the nonpunitive response to error dimension. The 
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HSOPSC used at the northeastern community hospital for the previous several years has 
just three items addressing this dimension. Organizations seeking to promote just culture 
principles likely would benefit from use of an instrument specifically designed to capture 
more in-depth understanding of these dimensions.  
Improvement interventions and strategies. Once a measurement mechanism 
using one of the many available surveys on safety culture or climate is in place, many 
organizations turn to the issue of how to leverage the survey data to initiate culture-
changing strategies. Morello et al. (2013) conducted a systematic review to examine the 
effectiveness of typical strategies for improving safety culture in hospitals. Morello et al. 
identified 21 studies using quantitative surveys to assess a variety of interventions that 
emerged in the health care literature between 1996 and 2011. Strategies included 
“leadership walk rounds, structured educational programs, team-based strategies, 
simulation-based training programs, multi-faceted unit-based programs, and multi-
component organizational interventions” (Morello et al., 2013, p. 13). Morello et al. 
concluded there was limited evidence suggesting an impact on safety-culture outcomes, 
with the exception of leadership walk rounds and multifaceted unit-based strategies. The 
researchers found limitations in the majority of the studies relating to methodological 
rigor and decried the expenditure of financial and human resources on interventions or 
strategies that were not evidence based or proven.  
A similar systematic review was conducted by Weaver et al. (2013) with 
evaluation of 32 studies relating to interventions geared toward improving safety culture. 
The interventions were similar to the ones identified by Morello et al. (2013): team 
training, executive walk rounds, interdisciplinary rounding, and multifaceted unit-based 
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programs. Weaver et al. had comparable findings to Morello et al., noting studies largely 
used low-quality pre- and postintervention methods of evaluation. This limited evidence 
suggested the interventions were effective in improving safety culture. 
Notably, neither Morello et al. (2013) nor Weaver et al. (2013) included studies of 
just culture as a safety-culture intervention, possibly because no studies existed in the 
defined time frame of the reviews using one of the mainstream safety-culture surveys. 
Organizations seemed more likely to target the leadership and management, teamwork, 
and communication dimensions of the survey results as areas for development. A shift in 
this trend began to emerge in the mid-2000s. Wachter (2010), a leading patient-safety 
expert, contended the movement from no-blame cultures to just cultures, which balance 
individual accountability with a systems focus, occurred as health care leaders began to 
recognize the impracticality of blaming everything on systems issues when clear 
individual accountability came into play. At this point, the health care literature began to 
reflect industry interest in developing just cultures, and the remainder of the literature 
review focuses on this issue. 
Outcomes. To date there has been limited progress in establishing relationships 
between stronger safety cultures in hospitals and improved safety performance (Singer, 
Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009). Singer et al. (2009) compared safety-culture survey 
data from 91 hospitals using the Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organizations 
survey with 12 Medicare patient-safety indicators, including a variety of postoperative 
complications, infection, and pressure ulcers. Singer et al. used correlation and regression 
statistics to conclude a lower incidence of complications was associated with 
organizations with stronger safety-culture scores. Theirs was one of the earliest studies to 
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establish a relationship of this type.  
Another study by Brown and Wolosin (2013), used correlation and regression 
statistical approaches to compare data on safety culture from the HSOPSC with nurse 
sensitive structure, process, and outcome data. The researchers were seeking to establish 
whether there were relationships between safety culture and (a) adverse outcomes of care, 
such as falls and hospital-acquired pressure ulcers; (b) processes of care, such as risk 
assessment for falls and hospital-acquired pressure ulcers; and (c) unit structural 
characteristics, such as staffing, skill mix, and nurse-to-patient ratios. Brown and 
Wolosin were able to establish relationships between safety culture and structure, 
process, and outcome variables of care, providing some evidence to support safety-
culture initiatives. The authors concluded more of this type of research is needed to 
strengthen the evidence base and extend the empirical knowledge for this topic. 
While research linking hospital safety cultures to improved safety performance is 
recently beginning to emerge in the literature, the same is not the case with research on 
just cultures. To date, no studies have been identified establishing a relationship between 
just cultures and improved patient care or process outcomes. This represents an 
opportunity to extend the safety-culture research. 
Just Culture 
 Marx (2001) contended unless the foundational issue of creating a nonpunitive 
environment to encourage reporting of one’s own or others’ mistakes is addressed, it will 
be nearly impossible to improve overall organizational system safety. Thus, researchers 
such as Marx, Reason (1997), and Dekker (2007) have called attention to the dimension 
of just culture as integral to the formation of a safety culture. 
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 The importance of just culture cannot be underestimated. In the landmark health 
care study, Silence Kills (Maxfield, Grenny, McMillan, Patterson, & Switzler, 2005), the 
scope of health care employees’ failure to speak up or report safety concerns was 
exposed. The mixed-methods study was conducted in 13 urban, suburban, and rural 
hospitals across the United States. Survey data were collected from 1,700 participants, 
including nurses (n = 1,143), doctors (n = 106), clinical care staff (n = 266), and 
administrators (n = 175). Using a qualitative approach, Maxfield et al. (2005) were able 
to categorize seven areas of conversation difficulty for health care employees: broken 
rules, mistakes, lack of support, incompetence, poor teamwork, disrespect, and 
micromanagement. Findings indicated about 10% of health care employees took 
shortcuts, made mistakes, and failed to provide needed support to team members, 
potentially endangering patients. Further, 81% and 53% of physicians and nurses, 
respectively, had experienced issues with an incompetent colleague (Maxfield et al., 
2005). Poor teamwork was pervasive, experienced by 88% of nurses and other clinical 
personnel; disrespect was experienced by 77% of nurses, with 33% subject to outright 
verbal abuse. Micromanagement was problematic for 52% of nurses and other clinical 
care staff. Among physicians and nurses, 56% and 78%, respectively, experienced 
difficulty speaking up to address issues of incompetence, poor teamwork, and disrespect 
or abuse. Only about 5–15% of health care workers would speak up in these situations, 
depending on the issue. Maxfield et al. (2005) contended the failure by health care 
employees to speak up when faced by one of the seven crucial conversations likely 
contributed to avoidable errors.  
Of the 10% of health care employees who would speak up and confront the 
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difficult conversations, Maxfield et al. (2005) demonstrated a positive correlation of .2 to 
.465 (p < .001) in achieving better patient care outcomes, exhibiting more discretionary 
effort or working beyond what is expected, and experiencing job satisfaction. Maxfield et 
al. (2005) recommended strategic, positive, assertion-communication skills training 
conducted by leaders as role models as a strategy to increase health care employee 
confidence in confronting difficult conversations. Limitations of the study were a modest 
convenience sample size and no stated psychometric test results for the survey instrument 
used. 
 A larger, follow-up, mixed-methods study surveyed nurses (n = 3, 403) and 
managers (n = 832) in operating rooms and intensive care units (Maxfield, Grenny, 
Lavandero, & Groah, 2010). An additional 2,383 nurses and managers participated in the 
qualitative aspect of the study. The study focused on three of the issues identified in the 
earlier Maxfield et al. (2005) study, termed undiscussables by the authors: shortcuts, 
incompetence, and disrespect. Maxfield et al. (2010) examined the relationship between 
uses of current safety tools, such as safety checklists, patient-care hand-off protocols, and 
medication-interaction warning systems, and experience with the undiscussable topics; 
they found the effectiveness of safety tool use and thereby patient safety was undermined 
if the nurses did not address these issues. There was an increase in the prevalence of the 
undiscussable topics from the 2005 study, perhaps partially explained by the differences 
in the sample; the 2005 study involved more medical-surgical nurses, and the 2010 study 
was in the more intense settings of the operating room and intensive care units. Maxfield 
et al. (2010) found an increase from the 2005 study in the number of nurses willing to 
speak up, with 21–31% stating they addressed issues of shortcuts, incompetence, and 
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disrespect. Nurse managers did a little better, with 28–41% reporting they speak up in 
these situations (Maxfield et al., 2010). 
 Maxfield et al. (2010) demonstrated significant negative correlations (r = –.11 to 
–.36, p < .001) between a multifaceted approach leveraging up to six sources of influence 
and lower incidences of shortcuts, incompetence, and disrespect. The more strategies 
used, the stronger the association. The researchers conducted a similar correlation 
exercise comparing Magnet and Beacon Award hospitals with incidence of shortcuts, 
incompetence, and disrespect and found weaker negative associations. These awards are 
designated to hospitals demonstrating nursing excellence in a variety of standards. 
 Both studies provided compelling and comprehensive information into specific 
barriers and conditions contributing to unsafe error-reporting environments. Maxfield et 
al. (2005) and Maxfield et al. (2010) proposed positive assertion-communication skills 
training as well as multifaceted approaches inclusive of implementing just culture to 
create psychologically safer work environments where health care employees would be 
encouraged to speak up and report safety concerns. Health care leaders can use the 
information from these studies to target interventions at the conditions undermining safe 
reporting environments and just cultures.    
 Frankel, Leonard, and Denham (2006) took a different stance on creating a culture 
of safety and just culture than Marx (2001). Whereas Marx maintained establishing a just 
culture is foundational to other safety strategies, Frankel et al. asserted that a 
comprehensive and integrated approach must include leadership commitment to just 
culture principles, as well as strategy and structures to implement teamwork training and 
leadership walk rounds. Leadership walk rounds are more than simply walking around to 
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create high leadership visibility, but rather promote a formalized cyclical flow of 
information whereby leaders engage with frontline clinicians. If safety concerns are aired, 
a designated pathway for follow-up, action planning, and feedback to the clinician is 
followed (Frankel et al., 2006). 
 Frankel et al. (2006) posed the argument for an integrated approach to create safe, 
highly reliable systems of care and cited examples of health systems and hospitals where 
this has occurred. However, the authors provided no data or evidence to support the 
argument. Moving forward, it will be helpful to have valid mechanisms to measure 
whether strategies such as a just culture are making a positive impact on patient safety.  
Definition and History of Just Culture 
Just culture consistently emerges as one of the dimensions or subcultures of a 
safety culture (Halligan & Zecevic, 2011; Sammer et al., 2010). Similar to safety culture, 
the concept of a just culture has its origins in high-risk industries such as aviation and 
nuclear power, arising from engineering and human-factors research. Likewise, this 
research accelerated after the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. A pioneer in organizational 
safety research, Reason (1997) described five attributes of a safety culture: an informed 
culture, a reporting culture, a just culture, a flexible culture, and a learning culture. Both 
Reason (1997) and Marx (2001) stressed the importance of balancing safety and 
accountability in a just culture.  
Similar to safety culture, there is no commonly recognized definition of just 
culture. Weiner et al. (2008) defined just culture as “an organizational context in which 
health professionals feel assured that they will receive fair treatment when they report 
safety incidents” (p. 403). Petschonek (2011) offered the following definition: “Just 
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culture describes an environment where professionals believe they will receive fair 
treatment if they are involved in an adverse event and trust the organization to treat each 
event as an opportunity for improving safety” (p. 18).  
Reason (1997) maintained safety culture was a product of people and systems, 
and breakdowns and adverse events can occur as a result of either aspect. Reason (1997) 
was the first to provide an algorithmic model to evaluate the degree of blameworthiness 
when an unsafe act or adverse event occurs. Reason’s (1997) decision tree guides the user 
through a series of questions designed to identify whether person or system is culpable or 
blameless. No specific guidance is provided for the management of the individual, once 
the outcome is determined. The approach tends to be reactive in that an unsafe act has to 
have occurred; therefore, there is no provision to address near misses or potential sources 
of harm.  
The just culture model offered by Marx (2001) expands the notion of balancing 
safety and accountability. Marx proposed individuals are subject to three duties: the duty 
to produce an outcome, the duty to follow procedural rules, and the duty to avoid causing 
unjustifiable risk or harm. Marx differentiated between human error, at-risk behaviors, 
and reckless behaviors and proposed separate pathways in the trademarked Just Culture 
Algorithm to reach a conclusion on how to manage breaches of the duties. Unlike the 
Reason (1997) model, guidance is provided for how to respond to the human behaviors 
through supporting, consoling, coaching, or punishing the individual, as indicated by the 
algorithm (Marx, 2001).  
Studies Related to Just Culture 
Just culture research and measurement. Although there has been much 
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discussion about just culture in non-peer-reviewed health care magazines and journals 
over the past decade, there is a paucity of peer-reviewed empirical research on the topic. 
Only four studies emerged from the database searches; two were conference proceedings 
(von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005; von Thaden, Hoppes, Li, Johnson, & Schriver, 2006), two 
were published in peer-reviewed journals (Petschonek et al., 2013; Vogelsmeier, Scott-
Cawiezell, Miller, & Griffith, 2010), and one was a doctoral dissertation (Petschonek, 
2011). All focused primarily on how to measure just culture. Additional peer-reviewed 
scholarly articles were also identified (Barger, Marella, & Charney, 2011; Barnsteiner & 
Disch, 2012; Khatri, Brown, & Hicks, 2009; Weiner et al., 2008).  
The largest study (N = 1,876) by von Thaden and Hoppes (2005) was conducted 
in 11 hospitals in five states: Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, and South 
Carolina. The study is the earliest one identified in the literature search to create a 
specific instrument for measuring just culture constructs in health care. The purpose of 
the study was to develop understanding of how to create a just culture in health care 
settings. Twenty survey items were extracted from validated research previously 
conducted in the aviation industry and included four dimensions: reporting systems, 
response and feedback, accountability, and basic safety. The survey used a 7-point Likert 
scale with 1 indicating strong disagreement, 4 being neutral, and 7 indicating strong 
agreement with the construct. No additional reliability or validity test data were provided 
for the instrument in the current study as applied to a health care setting. The Just Culture 
Survey developed by von Thaden and Hoppes was administered to employees from the 
11 hospitals. The researchers provided descriptive statistics of the study sample inclusive 
of age range, occupation, experience in position and experience in organization. The 
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largest group of respondents were nurses (59%), and nearly half (46.7%) were over the 
age of 45. Respondents were highly experienced in their positions, with more than 50% 
having over 8 years of experience. They were also very experienced in their 
organizations; 51% had worked within organizations more than 8 years. Mean scores for 
the Just Culture Survey were calculated for each individual participant, and the overall 
scores indicated a moderately positive perception of just culture within the respondents’ 
organizations. The highest scoring dimension was response and feedback (M = 4.99) and 
the weakest was accountability (M = 4.34). Of the individual items, von Thaden and 
Hoppes reported the weakest areas were fear of repercussions when reporting errors (M = 
3.42) and a blaming culture (M = 3.58). 
In a follow-up study, von Thaden et al. (2006) conducted additional analysis of 
the same data to assess perceptions of just culture across disciplines. Survey reliability 
was reported for the study, with Cronbach’s alpha for the survey items at .847. Statistical 
analysis was conducted using one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) and revealed 
significant differences in just culture perceptions between employee groups. Physician 
ratings were more positive than management (p < .001), and management ratings were 
more positive than nursing (p = .01). Another finding was a disparity in the perception of 
justice by department, with acute care areas such as the intensive care, surgery, and 
emergency departments holding the most negative view of just culture. Qualitative 
comments revealed a perceived bias in how the disciplines were treated if an error 
occurred, with nurses generally perceiving a more punitive response than physicians. The 
researchers concluded additional research should focus on determining the extent of just 
culture inconsistency among the disciplines (von Thaden et al., 2006). The current study 
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has addressed this issue and, although using a different survey instrument, it was 
interesting to determine whether similar themes would emerge in a community hospital 
setting.  
Vogelsmeier et al. (2010) conducted a study to determine whether just culture 
training would have any influence on alignment of leaders and staff perceptions of patient 
safety. The Missouri Center for Patient Safety and four other statewide regulatory 
agencies engaged leaders from 63 health care organizations in the 20-month collaborative 
study. Fifty-two organizations, including health systems, acute care hospitals, critical 
access hospitals, physician practices, and nursing homes, completed the collaborative. 
The researchers selected 14 items from eight dimensions of the HSOPSC survey and 
further modified the survey with the addition of three open-ended questions relating to 
error reporting, leadership response, and feedback to error to create a study instrument. 
Health care leaders from the organizations took the survey before (N = 485) and after (N 
= 439) receiving just culture training. The researchers compared the leaders’ results from 
the modified survey with the 2009 HSOPSC national database, which provides a rich 
repository of responses from hospital employees across the United States. Vogelsmeier et 
al. found that leaders from the organizations most engaged in the just culture training 
(i.e., attended all available sessions and training) had perceptions of patient safety more 
closely aligned with nursing staff than the leaders from organizations with minimal 
engagement (i.e., attended only one or two training sessions in just culture). Vogelsmeier 
et al.’s study supported the importance of leadership engagement in developing a just 
culture for safety; however more research needs to be done in this area. Haggard (2012) 
contested the importance of the leadership role, suggesting safety culture cannot be 
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created or dictated by hospital leaders but rather needs to occur from the efforts of 
frontline staff. 
In a doctoral dissertation obtained from the ProQuest database, Petschonek (2011) 
identified a gap in the literature with regards to a specific and validated survey instrument 
to measure just culture. Petschonek developed the JCAT to assess individual perceptions 
of just culture. Petschonek’s study focused on identification of the relevant dimensions of 
just culture using a deductive approach incorporating literature and theory review and 
expert input. Six dimensions of just culture emerged and were defined: “balance, trust, 
openness of communication, quality of the event reporting process, feedback and 
communication about events, and an overall goal of continuous improvement” 
(Petschonek, 2011, p. 28). Development and testing of survey items for each dimension 
were completed. The items were tested for content validity, and 31 items were retained. 
See Appendix A for a complete list of dimensions and items.  
The newly development survey instrument was subsequently administered to 
direct patient-care employees at a children’s research hospital (N = 366) and tested for 
psychometric soundness. A few elements fell below confirmatory factor analysis, and the 
survey was further revised to 27 items. Factor loadings were significant at p < .05 
(Petschonek, 2011). 
Petschonek (2011) identified some limitations in the development of the survey 
tool. The same sample was used for scale development and testing psychometric 
soundness. This practice is generally not recommended, as it may result in a tool that is 
sample specific. Hence, Petschonek recommended additional testing of the instrument in 
other health care organizations and settings representative of the population. Another 
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limitation was administration of the survey in tandem with the HSOPSC at the 
researcher’s organization, which might have led to some bias in responses. Petschonek 
recommended de-coupling the JCAT from any other survey when tested in another 
setting.  
In spite of the limitations, the JCAT is a promising survey tool and is the one 
selected for the current study. Petschonek’s (2011) goal was to develop a measurement 
tool for hospitals that ultimately could be used and benchmarked at the national level, 
similar to the HSOPSC. None of the previously described survey tools has been reported 
in the literature more than once, and no developers described as thorough psychometric 
testing as the JCAT. Petschonek’s dissertation has since been developed into an article 
published in a peer-reviewed journal (Petschonek et al., 2013). 
 A number of peer-reviewed scholarly articles round out the literature review. 
Weiner et al. (2008) explored the conceptual meaning of just culture and the attributes 
that make reporting systems just. In addition to the definition of just culture cited earlier 
in this document, Weiner et al. drew on the organizational justice literature in 
management to construct a conceptual model describing the role of justice in health care 
incident reporting. Weiner et al. found justice to be a multidimensional construct based 
on both processes and outcomes of incident reporting. It is perceived in different ways 
within organizations and is dependent upon distribution rules, procedural rules and social 
aspects. Weiner et al. stated, 
Health professionals judge the fairness of incident reporting systems based not 
just on the outcomes that they receive (distribution rules), but also on the 
procedures used to decide the outcomes (procedural rules) and the way that they 
are treated by decision makers (the social aspects of decision-making process). (p. 
409) 
An individual generates a variety of affective and behavioral reactions depending 
36 
 
 
on fairness of treatment when an event is reported. Affective reactions may be exhibited 
in such things as job satisfaction and organizational commitment, whereas behavioral 
reactions might impact job performance, teamwork, and organizational citizenship 
behaviors. Weiner et al. (2008) noted little is known as to whether differences exist in 
justice perceptions between health care professions such as nurses and physicians or 
between specialties; they suggested additional research in this area. The current study has 
addressed some of these questions. 
 A conceptual article by Khatri et al. (2009) delved into the challenges 
organizations face when moving from a culture of blame to a just culture. Khatri et al. 
defined a culture of blame as “a set of norms and attitudes within an organization 
characterized by an unwillingness to take risks or accept responsibility for mistakes 
because of a fear of criticism or management admonishment” (p. 314). Khatri et al. 
asserted cultures of blame are prevalent in traditional, hierarchical, control-based 
organizations, whereas just cultures are more likely to thrive in commitment-based 
organizations where trust, autonomy, innovation, and shared decision-making models 
prevail. Moreover, the authors maintained the human resource function plays a central 
role in promoting and supporting a just culture. In order to do so, the organization must 
develop human resource capabilities to promote organizational learning and 
commitment-based management practices (Khatri et al., 2009).  
Khatri et al.’s (2009) article suggested efforts to overlay just culture principles in 
traditional hierarchical organizations are likely to meet with limited or lukewarm success. 
An annual survey of 118 Pennsylvania hospitals by the state’s patient-safety authority 
revealed the majority of the hospitals (70%) reported integration of just culture principles 
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into policies and procedures (Barger et al., 2011). Subsequently, the patient-safety 
authority requested a gap analysis to determine if the hospital staff really understood just 
culture tenets. Ten hospitals voluntarily participated in the Pennsylvania Just Culture 
Project, completing a two-part self-assessment survey. Part 1 of the survey was designed 
to collect data on the degree to which just culture principles were embedded into policies 
and practices such as event investigations and human resource actions. Findings revealed 
out of a maximum 22 points for each hospital, the top score was 20, lowest was below 5, 
and a composite of all the hospital scores was 62 of a total possible 220 points. Most 
organizational leaders admitted the just culture principles were not as embedded in the 
organizations as they had initially thought (Barger et al., 2011). 
The 20 items in Part 2 of the survey measured leadership perceptions of just 
culture attributes such as system design, coaching, response to human error, at-risk 
behavior, and reckless behavior (Barger et al., 2011). The survey was completed by 10–
15 leaders in each of the responding organizations with a maximum achievable score of 
40. Results reflected an average score of 9.56. The results reflected organizations were 
getting better at evaluating close calls or near misses and were consistently disciplining 
employees demonstrating reckless behaviors; however, punitive environments were still 
prevalent for human error, and bias existed for treating physicians more leniently than 
other staff. Barger et al. (2011) concluded the organizations had overestimated progress 
toward implementation of just culture principles.  
Faltering starts and incomplete implementation of just culture principles are likely 
to continue as organizations grapple with slow-moving culture change (Khatri et al., 
2009). Another article revealed those in academic settings are also attempting to instill 
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just culture and patient-safety principles, values, and competencies into training programs 
for health care professionals (Barnsteiner & Disch, 2012). Barnsteiner and Disch (2012) 
noted most schools of nursing have never had formal structures and processes for 
reporting errors and therefore have to design the error-reporting systems as well as create 
the culture to encourage reporting. Knowledge about the extent of errors and near misses 
by students is therefore limited. Nursing schools face the same traditional, hierarchical 
barriers experienced in hospitals as well as similar cultures of blame and unrealistic 
expectations of perfection, which hinder transparency in information sharing and error 
reporting. Barnsteiner and Disch concluded the same need exists in academic settings to 
promote error reporting by both students and faculty to maximize learning from mistakes. 
Summary 
Based on the findings from this preliminary literature review, it is evident 
opportunity exists to extend the empirical knowledge base on the subject of just culture 
and strategies for creating psychological safety in error reporting. With three studies each 
representing different survey approaches to measuring just culture, it is important to 
further define and test measures of just culture constructs in a variety of settings. This 
applied research study provided an opportunity for further testing of the JCAT survey 
instrument and extended the research to a community hospital setting. 
Research Questions 
The following five research questions and hypotheses guided the applied research 
study: 
1. Is there a relationship between number of hours hospital clinicians spend in just 
culture training and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by 
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the JCAT? Null Hypothesis 1 was that there would be no relationship between number of 
hours hospital clinicians spend in just culture training and perception of fairness and 
justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT. 
2. Is there a relationship between perception of fairness and justice in error 
reporting as measured by the JCAT and employees in different departments, by age, or by 
gender? Null Hypothesis 2 was that there would be no relationship between perception of 
fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT and employees in 
different departments, positions, and of different age and gender. 
3. Is there a relationship between length of employment at the northeastern 
community hospital and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured 
by the JCAT? Null Hypothesis 3 was there would be no relationship between length of 
employment at the northeastern community hospital and perception of fairness and 
justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT. 
4. Is there a relationship between years of experience in profession or specialty 
and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT? Null 
Hypothesis 4 was there would be no relationship between years of experience in 
profession or specialty and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as 
measured by the JCAT. 
5. Is there a relationship between employees in different positions and perception 
of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT? Null Hypothesis 5 
was there would be no relationship between employee position and perception of fairness 
and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 The purpose of this applied research study was to examine hospital employees’ 
perceptions of fair and just culture in error reporting and to investigate any relationships 
resulting from the variables of position, management level (if applicable), job status, 
years of experience in professional specialty, length of employment at the community 
hospital, department worked, age, gender, and degree of participation in just culture 
training. The JCAT (Petschonek, 2011) was the survey instrument selected to collect data 
for the study.  
Data obtained from the AHRQ HSOPSC conducted at the northeastern 
community hospital for 6 consecutive years reflected a sustained improvement in 
nonpunitive response to error in the last two surveys conducted in 2012 and 2013. It was 
unclear if this response were directly related to the ongoing implementation of the just 
culture program, Safe Choices training, since other programs simultaneously have 
focused on leadership development and employee engagement. The JCAT is designed to 
focus specifically on just culture constructs and was used to test the research questions 
posed in Chapter 2. Positive results would lend credence to the hypothesis that 
introduction of a just culture model would improve employee perceptions of fairness and 
justice related to error reporting.  
Participants 
Population. The target population for the study was approximately 1,730 
hospital employees at a community hospital in the northeastern United States. The 
population consists of nurses, physicians, social workers, technicians, therapists, 
pharmacists, and other hospital employees such as clerical support staff. This is largely 
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a homogeneous, White, English-speaking group with a predominately female (70%) 
gender mix. The population is multigenerational and with varying levels of clinical and 
educational experience.  
Sample. A cross-sectional nonprobability convenience sample for the study 
consisted of all hospital employees at the northeastern community hospital who were 
willing to respond voluntarily and anonymously to an electronically administered 
survey. According to Gall, Gall, and Borg (2007), 95% of studies in the social sciences 
use this sampling approach, as random samples are not generally practical in the natural 
environment of the work setting. Administrative approval for the study was obtained 
from the hospital president and chief executive officer.  
Instruments  
The instrument selected for the study was the JCAT developed and validated by 
Petschonek (2011). See Appendix B for the survey instrument. Permission to use the 
instrument was obtained via a telephone conversation and follow-up e-mail with the 
researcher (S. Petschonek, personal communication, August 9, 2012). The instrument is a 
31-item, 7-point Likert-scale survey designed to assess six dimensions of just culture: 
feedback and communication (4 items), openness of communication (4 items), balance (7 
items), quality of the error-reporting process (5 items), continuous improvement (5 
items), and trust (6 items). See Appendix A for a complete list of dimensions and items. 
Factor analysis and reliability testing was conducted on the survey items by 
Petschonek (2011) as part of the dissertation process. Some of the items fell below 
confirmatory factor analysis. Petschonek used Cronbach’s alpha to establish internal 
reliability for the instrument. The Cronbach alpha ratings ranged from .6323 to .8599. 
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The lowest score of .6323 related to the quality of the event-reporting process. However, 
the dimension was considered “theoretically essential to the understanding of just 
culture” (Petschonek, 2011, p. 39) and therefore was retained in the survey. Petschonek 
recommended follow-up testing of the instrument with another sample and site. A 
demographic section was designed for the study to include position, management level (if 
applicable), job status, years of experience in professional specialty, length of 
employment at the community hospital, department worked, age, gender, and degree of 
participation in just culture training. See Appendix C for the detailed demographic 
questionnaire component of the survey developed specifically for this study. 
Procedures  
Design. The study used a correlational research design (Creswell, 2008). 
However, the method of data collection for this study precluded the proper use of the 
Pearson correlation coefficient because the independent variables, even when numeric, 
were collected using Likert-type scales. Other correlation techniques such as Spearman’s 
rho or multiple regression might be appropriate, and examination of the data would 
determine what statistical techniques would be best applied in order to obtain legitimate 
outcomes (Creswell, 2003).  
The just culture Safe Choices program (Outcome Engenuity, 2014) had been 
offered to employees at the northeastern community hospital over the previous 2 years. 
Employees were not required to attend the program, and as of Fall 2014, approximately 
40% of employees had attended at least a single module of the seven-module program. The 
JCAT (Appendix A) was designed to examine employee’s perceptions of fairness and 
justice as it relates to error reporting. Numerical values are assigned according to level of 
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agreement with the statements, enabling determination of an overall score for each 
participant on the survey. The researcher answered the stated research questions by 
exploring whether there were relationships between employees who had attended the Safe 
Choices program on just culture and level of perception of fairness and justice in error 
reporting. 
After necessary Institutional Review Board approvals were obtained from Nova 
Southeastern University and the northeastern community hospital, potential participants 
were recruited via e-mail. The researcher administered the JCAT survey instrument via an 
electronic survey mechanism, SurveyMonkey (2014), to the target population at the 
community hospital over a 1-month period. Three reminders were sent out over the 1-
month period. Gall et al. (2007) suggested a minimum sample size of 100 and, given the 
history of strong participation by employees at the community hospital on similar surveys, 
it was likely an adequate response would be achieved. Participation in the survey was 
voluntary and anonymous. Participants were required to agree to an initial page describing 
the purpose of the survey, ensuring anonymity, and explaining the option to leave the 
survey without submitting it at any point in the process, in order to progress through the 
survey. 
Data analysis. A combination of descriptive and correlational statistical 
procedures was used to analyze the data. The analyses were conducted using Excel 
running Real Statistics macros. The JCAT instrument was scored on a 7-point Likert 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with 4 representing a neutral 
stance. Totaling the results of these scores over the 31 items yielded a measure of 
perception of fairness and justice for each participant. The mean score and standard 
44 
 
 
deviation were calculated for the total JCAT and for the just culture dimensions outlined 
by Petschonek et al. (2013). In view of the stated goal of this study being to investigate 
whether there were relationships between populations of health care institution workers 
with respect to just culture perceptions, correlational statistical approaches such as 
Spearman’s rho were used wherever appropriate to answer Research Questions 1–5: 
1. Is there a relationship between number of hours hospital clinicians spend in just 
culture training and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by 
the JCAT?  
2. Is there a relationship between perception of fairness and justice in error 
reporting as measured by the JCAT and employees in different departments, by age, or by 
gender?  
3. Is there a relationship between length of employment at the northeastern 
community hospital and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured 
by the JCAT?  
4. Is there a relationship between years of experience in profession or specialty 
and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT? 
5. Is there a relationship between employees in different positions and perception 
of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT?  
Limitations 
 Petschonek et al. (2013) identified three limitations of the JCAT instrument: (a) 
no consensus on just culture definition in the literature; (b) use of the same sample for 
scale development and testing psychometric properties; and (c) presentation of the JCAT 
in combination with the HSOPSC, thereby potentially biasing responses. The 
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northeastern community hospital continues to administer the HSOPSC survey annually; 
however the timing of the study did not necessitate simultaneous presentation of the 
JCAT and HSOPSC for this study.   
 The JCAT is a new instrument and shows promise based on preliminary factor 
analysis conducted by the authors (Petschonek, 2011; Petschonek et al., 2013); however, 
it is virtually untested in other settings. It would remain to be seen if the instrument 
would demonstrate internal consistency when administered in another setting. It also 
would be important to recognize that data collected in a community hospital setting might 
not be applicable in other settings. 
 A convenience sample is not necessarily representative of the population. It was 
necessary to disclose this limitation in the discussion and refrain from making broad or 
misleading generalizations to the audience. 
 Finally, the dynamic environment of an acute care hospital presents many 
confounding variables when conducting applied research. Although it was impossible to 
control for all circumstances, this study applied statistical analysis to minimize the impact 
of interfering variables. The nature and volume of data collected might limit or constrict 
the conclusions that could be justifiably made by this study. When reporting results, it 
was important to maintain transparency about each of the study limitations. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of hospital employees’ 
overall perceptions of fairness and justice in relation to adverse event reporting by using 
the JCAT instrument to answer the five research questions. This chapter presents the 
results of the data analysis designed to answer the research questions. The chapter begins 
with a demographic description of the study participants. Subsequent sections delve into 
a detailed analysis of each of the research questions. 
Demographic Profile 
Surveys were distributed electronically by a link in a global e-mail to all health 
system employees. In order to filter off nonhospital employees who work in other 
divisions of the health system, participants were asked an initial question about site 
worked within the health system, resulting in 434 hospital employee participants or a 
25% response rate. Of these participants, 135 did not complete the entire survey. The 
final sample consisted of 299 individuals who fully completed the survey, an overall 17% 
response rate.  
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the participants by staff position. The largest 
groups of participants by position were nurses (27.8%), followed by technologists or 
technicians (14.3%) and administrators or managers (13.7%). When compared to the 
hospital population at large, each of these groups was overrepresented in the sample: 
nurses (20% of the hospital population), technologists (7%), and administrators or 
managers (8%). Leadership participants included three assistant vice presidents or vice 
presidents, 18 directors, and 34 frontline managers and supervisory personnel. The 
majority of the participants were full-time employees (n = 236), with 52 part-time and 11 
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per diem respondents. There were 240 female and 59 male participants, which was an 
exact representation of the hospital population at large. Participant age ranges were as 
follows: less than 25 years old, less than 1%; 25–34, 17%; 35–44, 26%; 45–54, 30%; and 
55 and older, 26%.  
Table 1 
Participants by Staff Position (N = 299) 
Staff position n % 
Registered nurse 83 27.8 
Technologist or technician (surgical, lab, cardiology, radiology) 43 14.4 
Administration or management 41 13.7 
Office or clerical 25   8.4 
Administrative support (health unit coordinator, administrative 
assistant) 
18   6.0 
Therapist (respiratory, physical, occupational, speech) 16   5.4 
Clinical support (emergency medical technician, licensed nursing 
assistant, transport) 
11   3.7 
Clinical social worker   7   2.3 
Nurse manager or charge nurse   6   2.0 
Service worker (housekeeper, food service)   6   2.0 
Physician assistant or nurse practitioner   5   1.7 
Physician   4   1.3 
Pharmacist   3   1.0 
Dietician or nutritionist   1   0.3 
Other 30 10.0 
 
 Participants were generally experienced within their specialty or profession, with 
82% having 6 or more years of experience (Table 2). Participants also demonstrated a 
high degree of tenure at the hospital, with 72% having worked at the hospital 6 or more 
years (Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Experience in Years in Specialty and at Hospital (N = 299) 
Years experience 
In specialty 
 
At hospital 
n % n % 
< 1 year   3   1  17   6 
1–5 years 50 17  67 22 
6–10 years 57 19  98 33 
11–15 years 45 15  54 18 
16–20 years 47 16  25   8 
21+ years 97 32  38 13 
 
 Table 3 provides an overview of participants by department. Departments with 
more than 15 respondents included Departments A and B (pseudonyms), Women and 
Children’s, Imaging Services, and the Cancer Center. Categories for other clinical and 
other nonclinical were made available for respondents whose departments were not listed 
due to small size or who were reluctant to identify their department. Notably, respondents 
to these categories comprised 40% of the sample. After reviewing this information, the 
researcher decided to forego additional analysis of the department-level data, since most 
departments had too few respondents to allow for meaningful analysis, and in hindsight 
the bucket categories were not useful. Instead, position data provided a more focused 
opportunity to evaluate hospital employees’ perceptions of the safety environment. 
 Table 4 itemizes the time respondents spent in just culture training. Most 
respondents had an hour or more of training (84%), and 25% of respondents had 6 hours 
or more of training. Of the latter group, 44% self-identified as leadership personnel, 
which is consistent with the organization’s requirement for leaders to attend 
approximately 14 hours of Just Culture for Healthcare Managers training (Outcome 
Engenuity, 2014). 
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Table 3 
Participants by Department Worked (N = 299) 
Department n % 
Other clinical 60 20 
Other nonclinical 60 20 
Cancer Center 26   9 
Imaging Services  22   7 
Department B 19   6 
Women & Children’s 15   5 
Laboratory 12   4 
Information Technology  10   3 
Preadmission, Operating Room, Same Day Surgery, Recovery Room 10   3 
Emergency Department   9   3 
Fiscal & Revenue   9   3 
Rehabilitation Services   8   3 
Social Work Services   8   3 
Critical Care Unit   7   2 
Care Management   7   2 
Department A   5   2 
Medical Information & Coding   5   2 
Wound Healing, Hyperbaric   3   1 
Cardiology   2   1 
Endoscopy, Center for Pain Management   2   1 
 
Table 4 
Hours of Just Culture Training (N = 299) 
Hours n % 
0 15   5 
< 1 hour 34 11 
1–2 hours 68 23 
2.5–3 hours 65 22 
3.5–5 hours 42 14 
6+ hours 75 25 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Participant performance scores on the JCAT ranged 183 points, from a minimum 
of 31 to a maximum of 214. The mean score was 139.78 out of a possible 217 points with 
a standard deviation of 35.53. The average response was 4.51 on the 1–7 scale, indicating 
a somewhat positive perception of just culture among respondents. The Cronbach’s alpha 
value of the overall data obtained by the survey instrument was .75, which is considered 
acceptable according to Nunnaly (as cited in Santos, 1999) and was greater than the 
Cronbach’s alpha score of .70 obtained by the instrument developers (Petschonek et al.., 
2013). Table 5 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the six dimensions of just culture as 
in the current study population. Petschonek et al.’s (2013) overall score statistics were not 
provided; however in comparing the means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alpha of 
the individual dimensions, the scores in the current study were generally lower. The 
standard deviations were distinctly higher than those in Petschonek et al.’s study, 
demonstrating a higher degree of variance in the current study.  
Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Scores for the Just 
Culture Dimensions  
Dimension M SD α No. items 
Feedback and communication 3.90 1.90 .70 3 
Openness of communication 4.39 1.98 .90 5 
Balance 4.48 1.82 .77 5 
Quality of event-reporting process 4.74 1.71 .76 5 
Continuous improvement 5.15 1.66 .89 4 
Trust 4.53 1.76 .83 5 
Note. Mean from a scale of 1–7. 
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Results for Research Question 1 
Is there a relationship between number of hours hospital employees spend in just 
culture training and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by 
the JCAT? The first question examined the relationship between perception of fairness 
and justice in error reporting and hours of just culture training. Table 6 presents the 
correlation coefficients for Research Questions 1–4. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
R value for Research Question 1 was .02, indicating no meaningful correlation. Creswell 
(2008) stated correlations of less than .20 have no value. This result suggests that training 
does not affect perception of just culture in the current overall study population, and the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected.  
Table 6 
Correlation Matrix 
Variable JCAT score Experience Longevity Age Gender Training 
JCAT score —      
Experience   .05 —     
Longevity –.06   .53 —    
Age   .11   .62 .49 —   
Gender   .02 –.03 .04 –.08 —  
Training   .02   .25 .23   .25 –.00 — 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
Results for Research Question 2 
Is there a relationship between perception of fairness and justice in error reporting 
as measured by the JCAT and employees in different departments, by age, or by gender? 
As previously discussed, department data were insufficient to draw reliable conclusions 
and were not included in the statistical results. The Pearson correlation coefficient R 
value for JCAT score and age was .11, indicating no meaningful correlation found 
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between JCAT score and age (Table 6). Similarly, the Pearson correlation coefficient R 
value for JCAT score and gender was .02, indicating no meaningful correlation found 
between JCAT score and gender (Table 6). Neither age nor gender appeared to have any 
effect on perception of just culture in the overall study population. 
Results for Research Question 3 
Is there a relationship between length of employment at the northeastern 
community hospital and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured 
by the JCAT? Research Question 3 examined whether length of employment, or 
longevity, had any effect on perception of just culture. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient R value for length of employment was –.06, indicating no meaningful 
correlation found between JCAT score and length of employment (Table 6). This finding 
suggests no evidence to support that length of employment has any bearing on perception 
of just culture, and the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
Results for Research Question 4 
Is there a relationship between years of experience in profession or specialty and 
perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT? The 
Pearson correlation coefficient R value for JCAT score and experience in specialty or 
profession was .05, indicating no meaningful correlation found between JCAT score and 
level of experience (Table 6). Therefore, a relationship could not be established between 
level of experience and perception of just culture, and the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected. 
Results for Research Question 5 
Is there a relationship between employees in different positions and perception of 
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fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT? Research Question 5 
introduced the use of nominal position data for obtaining more detailed analyses of 
specific position subgroups in the survey population. This data were neither numeric nor 
rank ordered, making it inappropriate for analysis by correlation coefficient, whether 
Pearson R or Spearman rho (Creswell, 2008). The presence of multiple nominal 
independent variables precluded the use of multiple t tests due to the possibility of 
increased statistical error rates. Therefore, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if there were any significant statistical differences between position groups 
with respect to perception of just culture. For meaningful results, only those positions 
consisting of more than 15 responses or 5% of the sample were included. This consisted 
of six groups: administration or management, administrative support, office or clerical, 
registered nurse, technologist or technician, and therapist. Table 7 provides summary data 
concerning these groups.  
Table 7 
One-Way Analysis of Variance by Participant Position (N = 226) 
Position Count 
Sum of JCAT 
score 
Average JCAT 
score Variance 
Administration or management 41   6,522 159.07 1,206.12 
Office or clerical 25   3,678 147.12   857.11 
Administrative support 18   2,587 143.72   954.21 
Registered nurse 83 11,466 138.14 1,144.47 
Therapist 16   2,111 131.94 1,727.13 
Technologist or technician 43   4,984 115.91 1,428.94 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
Whereas correlation testing suggested variations between groups (Appendix D), 
ANOVA testing was required to determine whether statistically significant differences 
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were present. ANOVA testing was performed, comparing these larger position groups 
with respect to JCAT scores. Table 8 demonstrates the results of ANOVA testing.  
Table 8 
Single-Factor Analysis of Variance by Participant Position 
Source SS df MS F p value F crit 
Between groups   42,340.9      5 8,468.173 7.03534 4.03E-06 2.25509 
Within groups 264,805.9 220 1,203.663    
Total 307,146.7 225     
 
When ANOVA was completed for all six groups, significant differences were 
found between groups, with a p value of 4.03E-06 (Table 8). Administration and 
management scored distinctly higher than the other groups, and technologists and 
technicians scored distinctly lower than the other groups (Table 7). In order to better 
determine where the statistically significant differences lay, individual groups were 
removed from the sample, and retesting was performed. When only the administration or 
management group was removed from ANOVA testing, the p value remained significant 
at .002. When only the technologist or technician group was removed, the p value again 
remained significant at .014. When both groups were removed, the p value was 
insignificant at .478, suggesting that these two groups were significant outliers.  
More rigorous assessment was performed using the Tukey procedure with 
pairwise comparisons of all the groups (Stevens, 1999). Statistically significant 
differences were found between the four following pairs of groups: (a) administration or 
management and registered nurse, (b) administration or management and technologist or 
technician; (b) office or clerical and technologist or technician, and (d) registered nurse 
and technologist or technician. This evaluation again strongly suggested that the 
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administration or management group was a high JCAT score outlier and that the 
technologist or technician group was a low JCAT score outlier. It is notable that the 
Tukey procedure in this case finds statistical significance only among the larger groups, 
suggesting that if the overall sample were larger, statistical significance also might have 
been found with the other groups. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Overview of the Study 
The previous chapter presented the statistical analyses of the study data and the 
results. This chapter summarizes, interprets, and discusses the findings in light of relevant 
research literature in the field. The chapter addresses theoretical, research, and practice 
implications of the study and concludes with a discussion of study limitations and 
recommendations for further research.  
The problem addressed in the study related to hospital employees’ perceptions of 
an unsafe error-reporting environment. The organization had been on a path to implement 
just culture principles over the past several years to enhance the culture of safety for error 
reporting. This correlational study was designed to provide a snapshot of the current state 
of the just culture by investigating if there was a relationship between hospital 
employees’ perceptions of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the 
JCAT instrument and a number of independent variables, including age, gender, position, 
experience, length of employment at the organization, and hours spent in just culture 
training. This information is of interest to organizational leaders who set the agenda for 
culture-shaping activities and likely will inform plans for future initiatives. Additionally, 
the research adds to the body of knowledge relating to patient-safety cultures in general 
and measurement of just cultures specifically.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
Research Question 1. The first research question examined whether there was a 
relationship between number of hours hospital employees spend in just culture training 
and perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT. The 
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JCAT is a relatively new instrument for measuring just culture and previously had been 
tested only once in the developer’s research setting, where it was found to demonstrate 
satisfactory psychometric properties (Petschonek, 2011). When taken as a whole, analysis 
of the test population did not display any significant relationships between perception of 
just culture and number of hours employees spent in just culture training (or by age, 
gender, experience, or length of employment at the hospital). An interesting observation 
emerged when JCAT scores were sorted for specific positions containing more than 5% 
of the sample, namely administrative support, administration or management, office or 
clerical, registered nurse, technologist or technician, and therapist (Appendix D). In these 
scenarios, that the administration or management group demonstrated a slightly enhanced 
perception of fairness and justice, whereas all of the other groups had slightly diminished 
perceptions of fairness and justice associated with hours of training, with the technologist 
or technician group particularly standing out in this respect. This finding, although 
numbers were small, suggests administration and management, who underwent more just 
culture training than other employees, might have a different cultural viewpoint than 
subordinates, certainly different than the technologist or technician group. 
Research Question 2. The second research question explored whether there was 
a relationship between perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured 
by the JCAT and employees in different departments, by age, or by gender. Initial 
examination of the data identified the question needed to be divided to most effectively 
deal with the two types of data, nominal and numeric. After this was accomplished, 
Question 2 focused on the numeric age and gender data. No meaningful correlations were 
found between JCAT score and age or gender; therefore, neither age nor gender appears 
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to have any effect on perception of just culture in the overall study population. One 
exception to this was in the largely female therapist group, which displayed a moderate  
(–.56) negative correlation between JCAT score and gender (Appendix D). Males tended 
to have higher JCAT scores, but there were only three males in the relatively small group 
of 16 individuals, and 2 of those 3 appeared to be statistical outliers. This finding skews 
the outcomes of such testing and raises serious questions concerning validity. At this 
time, there is no good evidence for a relationship between gender and JCAT scores in any 
of the subgroups. 
Research Question 3. The third question examined whether there was a 
relationship between length of employment at the northeastern community hospital and 
perception of fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT. The 
Pearson R correlation coefficient of –.06 suggested no evidence to support that length of 
employment has any bearing on perception of just culture in the overall study population. 
A strong negative correlation (–.78) was observed in the administrative support subgroup 
between JCAT score and length of employment within the organization (Appendix D). 
Four of the top five scorers in this group had 3 or fewer years of experience in the 
organization, whereas the remaining 13 employees had worked 8 or more years. This 
suggests the longer these employees worked in their position, the less inclined they were 
to view the organization as fair and just. The therapist group displayed this association to 
a lesser degree (–.35), and the remaining groups demonstrated no appreciable relationship 
(Appendix D). Perhaps the administrative support group became more cynical over the 
years.  
Research Question 4. The fourth question explored whether there was a 
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relationship between years of experience in the profession or specialty and perception of 
fairness and justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT. The Pearson R 
correlation coefficient of .05 indicated no apparent relationship between these variables. 
Evidently length of experience in profession or specialty has no bearing on perception of 
just culture in this cohort.  
Research Question 5. The fifth question explored whether there was a 
relationship between employees in different positions and perception of fairness and 
justice in error reporting as measured by the JCAT. The data for positions were analyzed 
separately from age and gender as originally planned (for Research Question 2). Two 
sampling issues emerged when preparing to analyze the position data. First, there was a 
wide range of variability in numbers representing various positions; many positions had 
fewer than seven respondents, making it impractical to use these data to draw any useful 
conclusions concerning those groups. Others had up to 83 respondents (Table 1). The 
researcher selected six positions, each representing 5% or more of the sample for further 
analysis: administration or management, administrative support, office or clerical, 
registered nurse, technologist or technician, and therapist. 
Second, the nominal position data did not lend itself well to statistical 
measurement using Pearson correlation coefficient R or Spearman rho. When comparing 
correlation matrices for the six positions selected for additional analyses against the six 
numeric variables—JCAT score and experience in profession or position, length of 
employment within the organization, age, gender, and hours of just culture training—the 
correlation tables suggested differences between the position groups (Appendix D). To 
further clarify and validate this finding, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. This 
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statistical test confirmed a significant difference between the groups. The administration 
or management group scored much higher than the other groups, and the technologists 
and technicians scored much lower. This result suggests the administrators and managers 
have a more positive perception of just culture than the technologists and technicians, 
who have a negative viewpoint. The administration or management group also received 
more just culture training hours than other groups, and in general this group is exposed to 
a variety of culture-shaping leadership development activities, which may serve as 
confounding variables and contribute to an overall more optimistic perception of just 
culture.   
Findings Related to Relevant Research 
 Measurement of just culture is a relatively new phenomenon that has emerged 
over the past decade, as this concept has grown in popularity within the heath care 
industry (Petschonek, 2011; Vogelsmeier et al., 2010; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). 
Only two focused instruments for measuring just culture emerged in the literature review 
(Petschonek, 2011; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). A third was a modification of the 
HSOPSC (Vogelsmeier et al., 2010). The researcher selected the JCAT instrument 
developed by Petschonek (2011) because it provided acceptable psychometric analysis 
data and the content and dimensions aligned well with the just culture experiences at the 
northeastern community hospital research site for the current study. Petschonek 
recommended extending the research with the instrument to other sites and to broader 
populations than clinical care staff. The current study achieved both of these 
recommendations. The northeastern community hospital is in a geographically different 
U.S. location than the original study, and the instrument was administered to a broader 
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population, inclusive of both clinical and nonclinical hospital employees. The current 
study essentially replicated Petschonek’s study and provides comparison data relating to 
instrument reliability and descriptive statistics. The Cronbach’s alpha value of the overall 
data obtained by the survey instrument for the current study was .75, which was slightly 
higher than the Cronbach’s alpha score of .70 obtained by Petschonek. This indicates the 
reliability of the instrument held up in a different study setting.  
Some differences emerged when comparing the dimension scores as described by 
Petschonek (2011). In general, the dimension scores for the current study were lower than 
the ones achieved by Petschonek, although still slightly positive, averaging 4.51 on the  
1–7 scale. Petschonek’s average dimension score was 5.42. This may indicate the 
northeastern community hospital has a less mature climate of just culture than the one at 
Petschonek’s research site. The lowest scoring dimension in both the Petschonek study 
(4.69) and the current study (3.90) was feedback and communication. This is surprising 
in that concerns about a punitive response to error and blame repeatedly have been the 
lowest scoring elements in the HSOPSC survey at the current study site. Perhaps 
employees simply desire a more transparent feedback and communication process when 
errors occur to help dispel concerns about retribution and blame. This finding 
substantiates the need to do a more comprehensive assessment of just culture concepts 
than permitted by the HSOPSC survey in organizations focused on strengthening just 
cultures.   
Another finding was a wider degree of variance in the standard deviation scores in 
the current study than in the Petschonek (2011) study. This likely was due to the more 
diverse sample inclusive of clinical and nonclinical hospital employees. Some outliers 
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had either very high or very low scores on the JCAT, possibly indicating some very 
optimistic employees and some very disgruntled or cynical employees. Aside from these 
issues, the current study was guided by a set of research questions that differed from 
Petschonek’s. Petschonek’s goal was to develop and test an instrument to measure just 
culture, whereas the purpose of the current study was to use the JCAT to assess the state 
of employee perceptions of the just culture at the northeastern community hospital. 
The studies by von Thaden and Hoppes (2005) and von Thaden et al. (2006) were 
significantly larger than the current study, conducted at 11 hospitals with 1,876 
participants. The samples in those studies were inclusive of clinical and nonclinical staff, 
as in the current study. The just culture dimensions were also slightly different in the von 
Thaden studies, with dimension scores ranging from 4.34–4.99 on a 1–7 scale. 
Nevertheless, these scores are closer to those in the current study than Petschonek’s 
(2011). Although the dimensions varied slightly, this finding suggests a more diverse 
sample consisting of clinical and nonclinical employees may affect the overall just 
culture score.  
The subsequent study by von Thaden et al. (2006) examined just culture 
perceptions across disciplines. Similar to the current study, von Thaden et al. found 
differences in just culture perception between different employee groups. Von Thaden et 
al. found physicians had the most positive viewpoint of just culture, followed by 
management. The current study did not have adequate physician respondents to make this 
assessment. However, an adequate number of management respondents was obtained and 
demonstrated a similar more positive viewpoint of just culture. Vogelsmeier et al. (2010) 
found the more engaged leaders, as measured by degree of participation in just culture 
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development activities, were likely to have perceptions of just culture more closely 
aligned with frontline staff. Less engaged leaders, or those attending minimal just culture 
developmental activities, were likely to have a more optimistic viewpoint of just culture 
than frontline staff. Singer et al. (2009) suggested frontline staff may have more realistic 
perceptions of safety climate in general than leaders who are not necessarily exposed to 
the day-to-day challenges and barriers to safety. This evidence suggests the gap between 
management and frontline staff perceptions of just culture may be a significant indicator 
of organizational just culture maturity. The more aligned management is with frontline 
staff, the more mature the just culture and the less concern frontline staff may have of 
fear of retribution and blame when mistakes occur.  
Implications 
Theory. Implications for theory, research, and practice are drawn from the current 
study. Study findings align with current theories and the selected theoretical framework. 
Edmondson (1999) produced evidence that leadership coaching was associated with team 
psychological safety in a model of work-team learning. Rathert and May (2007b) 
advanced this notion in the theoretical framework selected for the current study relating 
to person-centered work environments, psychological safety, and positive affect in health 
care. Leaders have a responsibility for creating safe person-centered work environments 
and promoting a supportive climate for patient-centered care, quality improvement, and 
benevolent ethical climates (Rathert & May, 2007b). The current study highlights a gap 
between leader and frontline staff perceptions of just culture that has been acknowledged 
in other studies (Vogelsmeier et al., 2010; von Thaden et al., 2006). This information 
suggests an opportunity to further investigate aspects of leadership coaching and support 
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that will support person-centered work environments.  
Research. The current study utilized a correlational design, which was 
appropriate for the one-time application of the JCAT instrument in the study setting, 
which already had implemented a sequence of just culture programs. Other designs such 
as time-series or repeated-measures designs would be appropriate if the opportunity 
existed to plan the study prior to program implementation. A good understanding of the 
type of data to be collected is essential to structure of research questions and selection of 
appropriate statistical tests. In the current study, the researcher initially posed a research 
question with variables representing different types of data requiring different statistical 
approaches. It is also helpful to maintain consistency of the measurement scale to enable 
comparison of concepts across studies. The current study, like those of Petschonek (2011) 
and von Thaden and Hoppes (2005), utilized a 7-point Likert scale. This consistency is 
helpful and should be considered in ongoing research.  
Practice. Organizations investing heavily in embedding just culture principles 
should consider use of measurement instruments designed to capture the specific nuances 
of these concepts. Organizational leaders routinely make decisions based on data that 
may be faulty or incomplete; therefore, it is important to select measurement instruments 
that produce the best quality data relevant to the concepts under study. Whereas the 
JCAT shows promise as a reliable study instrument for just culture concepts, others may 
provide as good or better data. Additional research is needed in this area.  
To date there is not enough empirical or benchmark data available to assist an 
organization to draw conclusions as to the health or maturity of its just culture. It is 
unknown what a right or good number is for an organization to claim or demonstrate 
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achievement of a strong fair and just culture. Therefore, organizations should proceed 
with caution in terms of making claims about the status of their culture. Again, research 
and benchmark data pools would be helpful to assist organizations to gain a better 
understanding and context when measuring just culture.   
Examining the alignment of frontline staff and leaders perceptions of safe and just 
cultures may provide important clues as to the maturity of an organization’s just culture. 
Organizational safety culture or just culture survey data should be routinely stratified by 
position to examine this trend. Additional research is needed to determine if this is a 
consistent finding. 
Limitations of the Study 
This was the first documented use of the JCAT instrument since the developer 
conducted the initial test in a pediatric research hospital (Petschonek, 2011; Petschonek et 
al., 2013). Other instruments developed specifically to measure just culture concepts 
surfaced in the literature review, but each was also reported only once in the literature 
(Vogelsmeier et al., 2010; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). Cronbach’s alpha testing 
conducted on the JCAT in the current study was consistent with and slightly stronger than 
that achieved by Petschonek (2011). However, Petschonek admitted some of the JCAT 
dimensions achieved less than optimal factor analysis scores, and therefore additional 
factor analysis should be conducted in future studies. It will be important to replicate 
similar studies in a variety of sites or in multisite studies to determine if the instrument 
and JCAT dimensions continue to display acceptable reliability.   
A convenience sample is not necessarily representative of the population, and 
voluntary responders to a just culture questionnaire might not have accurately represented 
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the opinions of the overall population at the research site. However, enforced 
participation in a study such as this would likely result in insincere or extreme responses. 
Additionally, the current study was conducted at a single community hospital site with a 
modest sample size, so the ability to generalize results to other settings is limited. 
Although some findings are consistent with those outlined in other studies, additional 
research is needed to substantiate the relevance to other settings and populations 
(Petschonek, 2011; Petschonek et al., 2013; Vogelsmeier et al., 2010; von Thaden & 
Hoppes, 2005).  
The dynamic environment of an acute care hospital presents many confounding 
variables when conducting applied research. As an example, concurrent staff and 
leadership development activities, extraneous and supplementary to education on just 
culture principles, were ongoing in the organization around the time of the current study. 
Specifically, many of the technologist or technician group might have been exposed to 
team training classes, and there were known morale issues within one group of 
technologists and technicians during the study time frame, which might have skewed 
individual responses. Leaders were also exposed to a variety of ongoing culture-shaping 
developmental activities. Although it was impossible to control for all circumstances, this 
study applied statistical techniques to minimize the impact of interfering variables.  
The use of a Likert scale is a commonly accepted practice in the social science 
setting, but there are questions as to its use. For example, some responders will view a 
Likert scale simply in yes–no terms, answering only using the extreme choices, and 
others will habitually select the middle choice. The second of these possibilities may be 
mitigated by the use of an even number of response choices, but only at the risk of losing 
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legitimate middle choice responses. Responses to demographic study elements also 
presented some issues. Various elements specifically relating to departments and 
positions or specialty had too few respondents. This limited the ability to use these data 
as planned as well as the conclusions that could be justifiably made by this study. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Petschonek’s (2011) vision was to develop an instrument that could be used in a 
variety of organizations, settings, and populations to prove the validity of the instrument, 
similar to the HSOPSC, particularly in those organizations dedicating time and resources 
to developing just cultures. With only one documented use of the JCAT instrument prior 
to the current study, additional research is needed to continue to establish reliability and 
validity of the JCAT instrument or another instrument that can be used consistently to 
produce benchmarking data for the health care industry. Without comparative data being 
available, there is little to go on as a means to establish when an organization 
demonstrates a strong just culture. Ideally, future studies will help to establish a 
comparative database, such as the one for the AHRQ HSOPSC, which will serve as a 
benchmarking guidepost for organizations seeking to strengthen just cultures. 
Additionally, it may be helpful to conduct studies comparing data obtained from use of 
the JCAT instrument and data obtained from the HSOPSC survey instrument. 
Additional research is needed in the area of the leadership role in supporting and 
promoting person-centered work environments where a just culture will flourish. Best 
practice strategies and activities that leaders can employ to enhance psychological safety 
and justice for hospital employees should be evaluated to determine if these strategies 
have any impact on patient care outcomes. 
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 JCAT Dimensions and Items 
Balance (Nonpunitive and Accountability) 
1. Staff members are usually blamed when involved in an event. 
2. Staff members fear disciplinary action when involved in an event. 
3. The disciplinary process regarding involvement in an event is too lax.  
4. There are too few consequences for those involved in events.  
5. The hospital uses a fair and balanced system when evaluating staff 
involvement in events. 
6. When an event occurs, the follow-up team looks at each step in the process to 
determine how the event happened. 
7. I feel comfortable entering reports about events in which I was involved. 
Trust 
8. I trust supervisors to do the right thing. 
9. I trust that the hospital will handle events fairly. 
10. I trust that I will be treated fairly when involved in an event. 
11. The hospital adheres to its own rules and policies. 
12. I am uncomfortable with others entering reports about events in which I was 
involved. 
13. I feel comfortable entering a report where others were involved. 
Openness of Communication (Bottom up) 
14. Supervisors respect suggestions from staff members. 
15. Staff can easily approach supervisors with ideas and concerns. 
16. Staff feel uncomfortable discussing events with supervisors. 
17. If I had a good idea for making an improvement, I believe my suggestion 
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would be carefully evaluated and taken seriously. 
Quality of the Event-Reporting Process 
18. The event reporting system is easy to use. 
19. I’m given time to enter event reports during work hours. 
20. My supervisors encourage me to report. 
21. Reports are being evaluated and reviewed after they’re entered. 
22. Coworkers discourage each other from reporting events. 
Feedback and Communication About Events (Top Down) 
23. The management does a good job of sharing information about events. 
24. I often hear about event conclusions and outcomes. 
25. It is easy access to information about reports . 
26. We don’t know about events that happen in our unit. 
Overall Goal of Continuous Improvement 
27. The hospital sees events as opportunities for improvement. 
28. There are improvements because of event reporting. 
29. The hospital devotes (time/energy/resources) toward making patient safety 
improvements. 
30. By entering reports, I’m making the hospital a safer place for the patients. 
31. Staff members use event reporting to “tattle” on each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. From Developing the Just Culture Assessment Tool: A Method for Measuring Individual Cultural 
Perceptions in a Healthcare Setting (Doctoral dissertation), by S. Petschonek, 2011, available from 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database (UMI No. 3497894). Used and reprinted with permission. 
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The JCAT 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. 
 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Moderately Disagree 
3. Slightly Disagree 
4. Neither 
5. Slightly Agree 
6. Moderately Agree 
7. Strongly Agree 
 
1. The management does a good job of sharing information 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 about events. 
2. Staff feel uncomfortable discussing events with supervisors. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. There are improvements because of event reporting.  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
4. The event reporting system is easy to use.   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
5. Staff members are usually blamed when involved in   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
an event. 
6. Reports are being evaluated and reviewed after they are  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
entered. 
7. I’m given time to enter event reports during work hours. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
8. Each employee is given a fair and objective follow-up  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
process regardless of his/her involvement in the event. 
9. I trust that the hospital will handle events fairly.   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
10. The hospital adheres to its own rules and policies.  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
11. I feel comfortable entering reports where others were  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
involved. 
12. We don’t know about events that happen in our unit.  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
13. The hospital devotes time/energy/resources toward   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
making patient safety improvements. 
14. Coworkers discourage each other from reporting events. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
15. It is easy access to information about reports.   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
16. Supervisors respect suggestions from staff members.  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
17. I trust supervisors to do the right thing.    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
18. When an event occurs, the follow up team looks at each  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
step in the process to determine how the event happened. 
19. The disciplinary process regarding involvement in an   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
event is too lax. 
20. By entering reports, I’m making the hospital a safer place 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
for the patients. 
21. I often hear about event conclusions and outcomes.  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
22. The hospital sees events as opportunities for improvement. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
23. Staff members fear disciplinary action when involved in 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
an event. 
24. My supervisors encourage me to report.     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
25. I feel comfortable entering reports about events in which  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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I was involved. 
26. Staff can easily approach supervisors with ideas and  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
concerns. 
27. There are too few consequences for those involved in  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
events. 
28. The hospital uses a fair and balanced system when   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
evaluating staff involvement in events. 
29. Staff members use event reporting to “tattle” on each other. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
30. I am uncomfortable with others entering reports about   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
events in which I was involved. 
31. If I had a good idea for making an improvement, I believe 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
my suggestion would be carefully evaluated and taken 
seriously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. From Developing the Just Culture Assessment Tool: A Method for Measuring Individual Cultural 
Perceptions in a Healthcare Setting (Doctoral dissertation), by S. Petschonek, 2011, available from 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database (UMI No. 3497894). Used and reprinted with permission. 
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Demographic Questionnaire 
Please complete each item. 
Position:  
 Physician 
 Registered Nurse 
 PA/NP 
 Nurse Manager/Charge Nurse 
 Pharmacist  
 Therapist (RT, PT, OT, Speech) 
 Clinical Social Worker 
 Dietician/Nutritionist 
 Clinical Support (EMT, LNA, Transport) 
 Technologist/Technician (Surg., Lab, EKG, Rad.) 
 Admin Support (HUC, Admin Asst) 
 Service Worker (Housekeeper, Food Service) 
 Administration/Management 
 Office and Clerical Personnel 
 Other (please specify): ________________________ 
Management Level (if applicable) 
 AVP/VP 
 Director 
 Manager/Supervisor 
 Not applicable 
 
Job Status: 
 Full-time 
 Part-time 
 Per diem 
 Agency/contract 
 
How many years of experience do you have in your current specialty or profession? 
 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 5 years 
 6 to 10 years 
 11 to 15 years 
 16 to 20 years 
 21 years or more 
 
How many years have you worked at this hospital? 
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 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 5 years 
 6 to 10 years 
 11 to 15 years 
 16 to 20 years 
 21 years or more 
 
Department 
 
 3 West/4 Garrison 
 3 Garrison 
 WMCH 
 CCU 
 PAS/OR/SDS/PACU 
 Endo/CPM 
 WHI/HBO 
 Emergency Department 
 Imaging Services 
 Laboratory 
 Cardiology 
 Rehab Services 
 Social Work Services 
 Care Management 
 SCC 
 Information Technology 
 Fiscal/Revenue 
 Medical Information/Coding 
 Other Clinical 
 Other Nonclinical 
 
Age 
 
 Less than 25 
 25 to 34 
 35 to 44 
 45 to 54 
 55 and older 
 
Gender 
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
How many hours of Just Culture Training have you attended? (Check HealthStream 
record) 
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 0 
 < 1 hour 
 1 to 2 hours  
 2.5 to 3 hours 
 3.5 to 5 hours 
 6 hours or more 
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Correlation Matrices by Position 
Table D1 
Correlation Matrix: Administrative Support (N = 18) 
Variable JCAT score Experience Longevity Age Gender Training 
JCAT score —      
Experience   .13 —     
Longevity –.78   .04 —    
Age   .24   .59 –.03 —   
Gender   .23 –.01 –.33 .08 —  
Training –.19 –.32   .18 .00 –.08 — 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
Table D2 
Correlation Matrix: Administration or Management (N = 41) 
Variable JCAT score Experience Longevity Age Gender Training 
JCAT score —      
Experience   .06 —     
Longevity   .10   .32 —    
Age   .24   .60 .32 —   
Gender –.23 –.20 .15 –.38 —  
Training   .26   .41 .08   .21 –.08 — 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
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Table D3 
Correlation Matrix: Office or Clerical (N = 25) 
Variable JCAT score Experience Longevity Age Gender Training 
JCAT score —      
Experience   .23 —     
Longevity   .17   .61 —    
Age   .23   .53   .45 —   
Gender   .02 –.10   .05 –.03 —  
Training –.14   .28   .18   .13 –.13 — 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
Table D4 
Correlation Matrix: Registered Nurse (N = 83) 
Variable JCAT score Experience Longevity Age Gender Training 
JCAT score —      
Experience –.12 —     
Longevity –.17 .60 —    
Age –.10 .73 .62 —   
Gender –.03 .15 .04 .05 —  
Training –.11 .20 .29 .31 .07 — 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
Table D5 
Correlation Matrix: Technologist or Technician (N = 43) 
Variable JCAT score Experience Longevity Age Gender Training 
JCAT score —      
Experience –.03 —     
Longevity –.19 .61 —    
Age   .13 .60 .57 —   
Gender   .25 .19 .15 .23 —  
Training –.39 .22 .23 .21 –.07 — 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
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Table D6 
Correlation Matrix: Therapist (N = 106) 
Variable JCAT score Experience Longevity Age Gender Training 
JCAT score —      
Experience –.12 —     
Longevity –.35   .74 —    
Age –.09   .78 .54 —   
Gender –.56 –.36 .07 –.23 —  
Training –.21 –.25 .00 –.38 .31 — 
Note. JCAT = Just Culture Assessment Tool.  
 
